


RIGA PAPERS

**NATO AND GLOBAL PARTNERS:
VIEWS FROM THE OUTSIDE**

Ronald D. Asmus, Editor

Riga, Latvia – November 27 – 29, 2006



© 2006 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Please direct enquiries to:

The German Marshall Fund of the United States
1744 R Street, NW
Washington DC 20009
T 1 202 745 3950
F 1 202 265 1662
E info@gmfus.org

This publication can be downloaded for free at <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/index.cfm>.
Limited print copies are also available. To request a copy, send an e-mail to info@gmfus.org

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the author's affiliation.

Riga Papers

NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside

Ronald D. Asmus, Editor

Riga, Latvia
November 27 – 29, 2006



PREFACE

Over the last decade it has become a tradition to gather the world's leading thinkers on NATO in advance of a major Alliance summit. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, along with the Latvian Transatlantic Organisation (LATO) and the Commission of Strategic Analysis, are proud to host this conference on the eve of the November 2006 Riga NATO summit.

This summit comes at a critical moment in NATO's history. The Alliance is deeply engaged in a difficult mission in Afghanistan and is at a critical juncture in terms of transforming itself for a very different strategic era in the 21st century. Should NATO aspire to new, more global missions in the wider Middle East and elsewhere? If so, then does it need new arrangements with non-NATO global partners? When and where should NATO seek to act and with what kinds of coalitions?

Should NATO continue to keep its door open to future enlargement to new democracies further East and South at a time when there are signs of enlargement fatigue in Europe? How should NATO transform itself to better be able to work together with the European Union around the world? And, what future should we envision for NATO-Russia relations in light of recent trends in Russia? Last but not least, does NATO have a role to play in new areas and on new issues ranging from energy security to homeland defense?

These are just some of the difficult questions that the Alliance must confront. In the spirit of stimulating thinking and debate on both sides of the Atlantic, we have commissioned five Riga Papers to address these and other issues.

In *Re~reinventing NATO*, Ronald D. Asmus and Richard C. Holbrooke provide a bold and ambitious American view on how to overhaul the Alliance so that it may assume more global responsibility and meet future global threats from two individuals deeply involved in NATO reform in the 1990s.


In *NATO's Only Future: The West Abroad*, Christoph Bertram offers a European perspective on the Alliance's future from one of the foremost thinkers and writers on NATO affairs on the continent. He warns that the Alliance is losing the support of its members and that it must do a much better job in addressing their real security needs by broadening its ambitions and horizons, if it is ever to regain its former centrality.

In *NATO in the Age of Populism*, Ivan Krastev analyzes the dangers of the rise in populism in Europe and the challenge this presents for maintaining public support for the Alliance as well as effective decision-making as NATO tries to respond to new global threats. He argues that the only way NATO can go global without falling victim to a populist backlash is to transform itself into a two-pillar Alliance.

In *Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia*, Žaneta Ozoliņa provides the perspective of a smaller, Northern European country on these issues and debates. This essay highlights the complexity of the challenge that NATO's transformation poses for smaller NATO members as well as ongoing priority and commitment to keeping NATO's door open for additional new members.

The fifth and final Riga Paper is entitled *NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside*. Edited by Ronald D. Asmus, it consists of four essays by authors from Israel, the Persian Gulf, Australia and Japan. These authors explore what their countries might expect from the Alliance in the future, as NATO seeks to develop a new concept of global partnership.

GMF is delighted to offer these papers as part of the intellectual legacy of this Riga conference and summit. We consider them a key contribution to the spirit of transatlantic debate and partnership that it is our mission to support.



Craig Kennedy
President of the German Marshall Fund of the United States



Table of Contents

Introduction by Ronald D. Asmus	1
Anchoring Israel to the Euroatlantic Community: Further Upgrading and Institutionalizing NATO-Israel Relations by Uzi Arad, Ambassador Oded Eran and Tommy Steiner	4
What do the Gulf Cooperation Council States want from NATO? by Abdulaziz O. Sager	17
Future Directions for NATO: An Australian Perspective by Jeffrey Grey	26
Can Japan Be a Global Partner for NATO? by Masashi Nishihara	34
About the Authors	43
About the Organizers of the Riga Conference	47



NATO AND GLOBAL PARTNERS: VIEWS FROM THE OUTSIDE

Ronald D. Asmus, Editor

One of the central issues facing NATO today is whether it should assume more global responsibility and missions in a world in which the threats to North America and Europe increasingly emanate from beyond the European continent. As the Alliance has debated this question, it has started to address whether and how to construct new relationships with potential partners as it moves to defend Alliance members against new global threats.

Thus, the question of NATO's global partners is one which has moved onto the Alliance's agenda and been increasingly debated in the run-up to the Riga Summit. The Alliance first crossed the threshold of working with non-NATO countries in the Balkans in the 1990s. But, the majority of those partners were European countries already building close working relationships with the Alliance through the Partnership for Peace and other programs. As we look into the future and contemplate missions to address new global threats, it is clear that non-European partners will be increasingly important, something that the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan has already underscored.

For understandable reasons, this debate in Brussels and allied member states has focused primarily on what NATO members might get out of such developments. And, from the Alliance's perspective, there have been two issues that have been paramount. One has been the Alliance's interest in sharing the burdens represented by such missions by attracting non-NATO, non-European, countries willing and able to contribute military forces. Attracting such forces is increasingly critical as NATO members find themselves stretched to meet the demands of these new missions.

The other consideration has been how to best work with new non-European, non-NATO, countries to meet their respective political requirements and facilitate their participation in such missions. NATO has its own Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative that have created a set of relationships and partnerships in the Middle East. But, the future scope of NATO action and the need for cooperation now goes beyond those dialogues and countries. The long-standing rule in NATO has been that the more troops a country is prepared to put on the ground, the greater its voice should be in Alliance decision-making. This has, in turn, raised the issue of how NATO includes non-European contributors in its decision-making about such future operations. If a country such as Australia makes a significant contribution to such an operation, perhaps larger than many NATO members, how can that be reflected in internal Alliance decision-making?

Behind these considerations lie some more fundamental political and strategic questions. Is this exercise solely or primarily about generating more forces for NATO-led coalitions? Or is it also about building closer partnerships to provide reassurance or additional elements of security to countries beyond Europe that NATO members want to assist? Will NATO, in the future, continue to see itself as an exclusively American-European alliance that increasingly works closely with non-European partners? Or should NATO define itself as the military arm of the Western democratic world and, therefore, be open to close partnerships with other non-European democracies that could eventually become strategic in nature and even grow into membership at some point in the future?

If so, should the concept of global partners for NATO be a first step in that direction? That question may not yet be officially on the table in Brussels or Mons (headquarters of SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, has repeatedly underscored that in his view a global NATO is not needed, but rather an Alliance that defends its members against new global threats and which can reach out to new partners in doing so. But, such issues are nevertheless part of a broader debate that is not yet finished.

As NATO debates these issues, it is critical that we understand the interests and motivations of the potential global partners being discussed. This is an aspect that has, thus far, received too little attention in the Brussels debate, which naturally focuses on NATO needs. But, partnership is a two way street. Therefore, it is necessary to ask what these countries want from a partnership with NATO and why. Are they just interested in contributing to NATO-led missions whose success they support or do they, too, have security needs they are seeking to meet through such cooperation? How well is the potential, as well as the constraints that limit their potential future role and contribution, understood?

To shed light on these issues, GMF asked authors from four very different countries and regions to write essays on how they view NATO's emerging concept of global partners and what kind of relationship they believe their countries were or should be seeking to have with the Alliance and why. Our authors come from Israel, the Persian Gulf, Australia and Japan. This cross section of views provides a very interesting set of insights into why countries as diverse as these, each have their own interest in a closer relationship with NATO.

They also reveal the different calculations that motivate different countries to seek closer ties to NATO. Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council are obviously very different in a myriad of ways. Yet, the essays by Uzi Arad, Ambassador Oded Eran and Tommy Steiner on the one hand and Abdulaziz Sager on the other have one thing in common. Both Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) do not view a closer relationship with NATO first and foremost in terms of finding more effective ways to contribute their countries forces or assets to future NATO-led missions. Instead, it is part of an overall effort in Israel and the GCC to enhance their own security at a time when the Middle East is becoming a more dangerous place.

Australia and Japan are both Asian countries and bring very different perspectives to the table. While Australia is often held up as the prototypical new global partner for NATO, the essay by Jeffrey Grey points out the constraints and broader foreign policy considerations that will also impact on Canberra as it considers a new relationship with the Alliance. And, the essay by Masashi Nishihara underscores the even more

interesting and complicated set of political issues that shape Japanese thinking as Tokyo seeks to develop ties with NATO as part of a broader redefinition of Japan's foreign policy role.

Each of these essays is interesting and important to read in its own right. Understanding the motivations of potential global partners is critical if NATO is to successfully build bridges and global partnerships beyond Europe. Together, they provide a fascinating overview of the different reasons why NATO is or can be attractive as a partner in different parts of the world. There is potentially more interest in and demand for closer ties with NATO than often realized. There are indeed countries who would welcome close ties with a NATO willing to work with them and able to project stability to their respective neighborhoods.

At the same time, these essays also underscore a more fundamental point and issue that is reflected in several of the Riga Papers. At the end of the day, the willingness of these countries to partner with NATO depends on the successful reform in the Alliance. The ability to attract and forge new partnerships depends on whether NATO can transform itself into the kind of modern Alliance that addresses global threats and can help meet the security needs of these countries. If NATO succeeds in making that leap, the Alliance will not suffer from a shortage of global partners wanting to work with it. If it fails to do so, the interest in becoming a global partner of NATO will wane.

ANCHORING ISRAEL TO THE EUROATLANTIC COMMUNITY: FURTHER UPGRADING AND INSTITUTIONALIZING NATO-ISRAEL RELATIONS¹

*Uzi Arad, Ambassador Oded Eran,
Tommy Steiner*

Major strategic developments across the transatlantic arena and the Broader Middle East coupled with concrete progress in Israel's relations with NATO and the European Union present new opportunities for anchoring Israel to the Euroatlantic community.² Israeli and Atlantic establishments recognize that mutual interests and values are increasingly tying Israel to the Atlantic community from a strategic perspective. Perhaps most importantly, the European Union and NATO consider Israel a strategic partner in practice, though this has not yet been formalized.

The following considerations focus on the future of NATO-Israel relations, yet it is embedded in a broad conceptual framework that sets out a new and explicit strategic direction for Israel's foreign relations, deepening both Israel's association with the Atlantic community and its multilateral diplomacy. Within this framework, the importance of further expanding and institutionalizing NATO-Israel relations cannot be exaggerated.

NATO is the icon and principal multilateral institution of the Atlantic community. Israel shares with NATO the core values enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty. More importantly, the current strategic challenges and threats facing the Alliance, namely radical Islam, global terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are the very same threats Israel faces. In this unfolding challenge, Israel is a natural partner to NATO. The Western civilization and the Atlantic Community, which NATO defends, are Israel's natural habitat.

The timing of the publication of this contribution is opportune for several reasons. Perhaps most concretely, NATO and Israel have only recently institutionalized their bilateral working relations and concluded the first ever Individual Cooperation Program (ICP) offered by NATO. While technical in nature, it resembles in substance and in format equivalent programs that NATO has established with its Euroatlantic

¹ The authors acknowledge with thanks the assistance of Maya Sion and Skye Montgomery in the preparation of this contribution.

² The authors borrow the term "anchoring" from Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce Jackson, reflecting the closest possible relationship between Israel and the principal Atlantic institutions. See Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, "Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO?" Policy Review, February and March 2005.

partners and it is the first ever beyond the Euroatlantic community. Moreover, during the negotiations, NATO expected Israel to assign assets to NATO operations and to take part in the Alliance's "burden sharing". It is, therefore, safe to say that this new program establishes a *de facto* partnership between NATO and Israel. In the ICP, Israel stated its desire to formalize partnership with NATO.

On a broader scale, a politically and militarily transformed NATO is of major strategic importance to Israel as well. There is a growing understanding among a vast majority of NATO allies that the time has come to solidify the decision to transform the Alliance, so as to meet new strategic challenges and threats. NATO's institutional structures, strategic concept and partnerships should be adapted to the new strategic requirements. Israel only stands to benefit from a more robust strategic partner. The recent war in Lebanon and its aftermath show that the Mediterranean and the Middle East need a transformed NATO able to operate effectively and swiftly.

The NATO Riga Summit should take the necessary steps towards reforming NATO and laying the foundations for "next generation" partnerships that will assume a "global flexible approach", as suggested by a senior NATO official.³ The new partnerships should be designed on a case by case, functional and tailored basis, so as to best serve NATO's goals and missions, as well as their perspective partners' interests and capabilities. Such a reform could constitute an important step forward for upgrading and redesigning Israel's standing within the Alliance.

Thus, it does appear that there is a strategic opening for anchoring Israel to the Euroatlantic community, that is, to achieve a comprehensive association with both the United States and Europe across the political, economic, societal and military spectrums. Notably, the upper echelons in Israel's political and military elites are assigning growing strategic interest to NATO. However, an internal Israeli debate over the future course of relations has not yet taken place and there are serious Israeli concerns and reservations over a significant upgrade of such. The critical domestic and regional challenges notwithstanding, Israel could and should begin this debate and seize the opportunities to enhance its standing in NATO and the Euroatlantic community.

What follows is an assessment based upon more than two years of targeted activities, informal meetings and seminars in Israel, Europe and the United States, co-organized by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and the Atlantic Forum of Israel (AFI). This network engaged public figures, senior officials, academics and business people. While these and other exchanges inspired its content, this paper does not necessarily reflect the positions of all the participants, nor does it represent an official policy, though perhaps it should.

³ A Senior NATO official speaking under "Chatham House rules" at an international workshop hosted by the Atlantic Forum of Israel in November 2005.

Deepening Israel's Multilateral Diplomacy

For the unfamiliar observer, the notion that any country in the contemporary global and networked system should reinforce and build upon multilateralism to attain national interests is a taken-for-granted truism. In the post-Cold War era, multilateral forums have become the major venue for shaping regional and global affairs. In an age marked by enhanced interconnectedness across multiple dimensions, ranging from defense and security, through finance and trade, to health and environmental protection, governments find multilateral cooperation with other like-minded governments a most effective and efficient form of governance. Common threats are dealt with together, or in Anne-Marie Slaughter's succinct argument "*networked threats require a networked response*". The "new world order", as Slaughter argues, is the emergence of a global web of government networks.⁴ Many of these networks are based on regional institutions and governments increasingly rely on regionally-based governance. Governments cultivate regional institutions to foster political dialogue, policy coordination and exchange of information.

Israel, however, has a tradition of managing its foreign relations on a bilateral basis and has limited diplomatic and policy experience with multilateralism. Moreover, there is an ingrained belief that bilateralism ensures broader maneuverability and more freedom of action. Israel's international security relations are a useful case in point. Israel has solid long-lasting working relations with several key members of the Euroatlantic community, not only with the United States. However, Israel is literally absent from the multilateral strategic frameworks of this community, which through NATO and the EU, increasingly govern security and defense affairs.

Some argue that Israel is reluctant to engage its international interlocutors multilaterally because of its historical experience. At multilateral levels in comparison to bilateral ones, Israel was unable to get its message across. Consequently, it has come to view many international institutions warily. The overwhelming nominal majority that Arab and Muslim countries muster in international institutions has led Israel to generally perceive these organizations as hostile. The 2001 United Nations World Conference against Racism in Durban, South Africa, is a vivid example of how an official multilateral conference became the center stage for anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic rhetoric delegitimizing Israel's very existence. Not surprisingly, most of Israel's engagement with multilateral organizations has been confined to countering or trying to prevent such adverse resolutions in an attempt to minimize their damage. It was only in 2002 that Israel was accepted to a UN regional group, the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), and only in the New York regional group system. To date, Israel remains excluded from the UN regional group systems outside New York. This situation manifests Israel's geopolitical isolation and limited experience with multilateralism.

The bedrock for multilateralism is regional-based multilateral institutions, but Israel is deprived from the benefits of regionalism in the Middle East for political and religious reasons. Time and again, Israel has proposed the creation of regional

⁴ Anne-Marie Slaughter, "A New World Order", Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004.

institutions, but was repeatedly turned down. The only regional experience Israel can account for is not really “regional”. That was the short-lived Madrid-based multilateral track and the various regional forums of the Euroatlantic institutions: the EU-led Barcelona Process/Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation. But, the outcomes of these frameworks fell short of their initial expectations and stated potential. For instance, prior to the conclusion of the new NATO-Israel agreement, Israel considered the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue particularly disappointing and frustrating. As it sought to develop meaningful cooperation, it was held captive to the lowest common denominator defined by other Mediterranean partners, who had lower expectations for this dialogue. This experience and similar others have driven home the conclusion that engaging in regional multilateral cooperation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean cannot produce meaningful results for Israel.⁵

As correct as this assessment may be, Israel should not, and cannot afford to, deprive itself of the potential of developing meaningful associations with multilateral frameworks. Hitherto, senior Israeli officials have invariably ignored the opportunities of multilateralism and political associations, citing the shortcomings of multilateral cooperation and governance. Undoubtedly, multilateral cooperation incurs costs, but it can also bring substantial benefits. Working through multilateral institutions is time consuming and results in delays in obtaining consensus and in carrying out joint activities due to inherent political divisions and occasional politicking. Nonetheless, certain policy issues mandate multilateral cooperation, while in other cases multilateral action provides domestic and international legitimacy, burden sharing and access to knowledge and information. Multilateralism may indeed limit political maneuverability, but it also substantially enriches the menu of policy options available to the executive leadership. As Charles Krauthammer recently pointed out, there are situations in which “*even the most ardent unilateralist*” would opt for multilateral solutions.⁶

Israel is apparently missing out. While the multilateral course will not always be the most effective, it should be a serious and carefully considered policy option. As discussed below, there is increasing interest in engaging Israel in the multilateral frameworks of the Euroatlantic community. There are initial indications that senior Israeli officials are beginning to realize the opportunities of multilateralism. Speaking at a recent NATO-Israel conference, Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tzipi Livni, noted the need to bolster Israel’s multilateral diplomacy. Yet to be determined a foreign policy priority, Israel needs to pursue this route far more vigorously.

5 Oded Eran, “Israel and Europe - Options for Future Relations”, Challenge Europe Issue 12, September 2004. Available at <http://www.epc.eu/en/ce.asp?TYP=CE&LV=177&see=y&t=42&PG=CE/EN/detail&l=4&AI=388>.

6 Charles Krauthammer, “The Perils Of Using ‘The Allies’”, Washington Post, August 25, 2006, p. A17

Deepening Israel's Association with the Atlantic Community

From an Israeli point of view, the need to enhance and deepen relations with the Atlantic community stems from strategic instrumental reasoning reinforced by a normative perspective of associating Israel politically with its natural habitat of like-minded countries.

First and foremost, and despite the inherent and occasional tensions and disputes, the Atlantic community has been crucial in the shaping of international politics ever since World War II. The Euroatlantic community brought about the peaceful and positive resolution of the Cold War and will remain the nucleus of world politics for the foreseeable future. Over the past six decades, tensions and crises befell the community and doubts and skepticism concerning its durability loomed high. Nonetheless, Euroatlantic relations have considerably improved over the past two years, or as Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns said “*we stopped the war of words across the Atlantic*”.⁷ Lawrence Freedman pointed out that recent intensive exchanges between the United States and Europe may have contributed to the development of “*a shared strategy and a multilateral methodology... In different ways the Americans and the Europeans have come to appreciate the limits to what they can do by themselves.*”⁸

Israel has a vested interest in enhancing its multilateral engagement with the Atlantic community because the Broader Middle East is the main arena affected by the Euro-American rapprochement. Moreover, the United States appears to have been encouraging a higher European profile in the region and in Arab-Israeli relations ever since the formation of the Quartet (consisting of the U.S., EU, UN and Russia) and the formulization of the Roadmap document, in which the United States accepted and underwrote the European approach to the conflict, a *modus operandi* frequently repeated since.

The principal European role in the aftermath of the 2006 war in Lebanon endorsed by the U.S. further reflects the burgeoning relationship evident in several instances of close EU-U.S. cooperation, consultation and coordination. Spearheaded by France and the United States, the international community resolved to end Syria's occupation of Lebanon and to investigate the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik El-Hariri. The United States has also publicly backed European efforts to bring about the cessation of Iran's uranium enrichment program and to halt its march towards military nuclear capabilities in the EU-3 framework. Together, they led the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution to transfer the matter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The EU even succeeded to sign the United States up to a comprehensive package of trade, technological and political incentives to elicit Iranian consent to halting its nuclear program. Both parties used the harshest terms to denounce Iran's President's recent remarks on the holocaust and Israel. On the Israeli-Palestinian track and through the Quartet, the EU and the United States cooperated

⁷ Remarks at the European Institute Gala Dinner, Washington, DC, December 15, 2005, available at <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/58488.htm>.

⁸ Lawrence Freedman, “The Transatlantic Agenda: Vision and Counter-Vision”, *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 4, Winter 2005-6, p. 19.

closely and together they forged the agreement on Raffah border crossings between Gaza and Egypt, which resulted in the deployment of European monitors.

The close EU-U.S. engagement in the region stems from the fact that the Middle East is home to the major threats facing the Euroatlantic community including radical Islam, terrorism, WMD proliferation and illegal immigration. These threats, aimed at Israel as well, mean that the latter is more than ever before on the Euroatlantic side. History, particularly the history of the Euroatlantic community, proves that common threats can create closer allies. The major institutions operating in the sphere of the Euroatlantic community, the G8, NATO and the EU are increasing their engagement in the region to confront, *inter alia*, these threats. Their actions and policies might well have substantial strategic effects on Israel. It is, therefore, in Israel's interest to be part of this process. The format and visibility of this involvement may fluctuate, as will the ability to affect decision making, yet, Israel should be at the table to share its experience, understanding and certain capabilities that could support an effective effort on behalf of the community's institutions.

The above notwithstanding, some parts, if not the major part, of the Israeli strategic and foreign policy establishment question and doubt the necessity to develop a comprehensive strategic partnership, let alone alliance, with both the United States and Europe. They would argue that Israel should retain and upgrade its special strategic relationship with the United States alone. According to them, seeking to expand this relationship to encompass the entire Atlantic community would not only be useless and highly unrealistic, it would also considerably impede Israel's strategic freedom of action.

The position espoused by the authors is that pursuit of a strategic and comprehensive partnership with both the United States and with Europe does not discount the vital strategic alliance with the former. Quite the contrary. Britain's strategic posture is a useful case in point. Most observers consider British integration in the European Community since the 1970s as a factor that has enhanced Britain's strategic value for the United States, not diminished it.⁹ Dealing with mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings between Europe and Israel could improve Israel's political and strategic relations with Europe. This in turn, could contribute directly to improving the state of transatlantic relations, as Israel and the Middle East Peace Process are one of the main sources of discord between the United States and Europe. Solid political relations between Israel and Europe will only add to what makes Israel today a strategic asset for the United States in the Middle East.

Moreover, Europe's international diplomatic and strategic profile is on the rise. While it is still difficult to consider the European Union as a major unitary political power, it has made substantial progress in enhancing its diplomatic and strategic international role, particularly in the Middle East. The United States expects European countries to increase their "burden sharing" in carrying out Euroatlantic missions and not to rely solely on U.S. military resources. This corresponds with the above noted European role in shaping the Euroatlantic approach to the Broader Middle East, through the Quartet and its Roadmap, through NATO and the enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue and the

⁹ Gideon Rachman, "Is the Anglo-American Relationship Still Special?", in *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 24, no. 2, 2001, pp. 7-20.

new Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and finally, through G8 activities to promote political and economic reforms in the Broader Middle East.¹⁰

Several statements appear to reveal changing attitudes in Europe. Most recently, the NATO Deputy Secretary General noted that with the conclusion of the new agreement between Israel and NATO the relationship “*has acquired a strategic value in its own right.*”¹¹ A senior European official also pointed out that the common strategic threats facing both Europe and Israel establish a strategic partnership between them.¹² The Head of Israel’s Mission to the EU recently observed an EU-Israeli rapprochement concluding that this relationship is undergoing a “quiet revolution.”¹³ A senior NATO official went as far as stating that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should not become an “alibi” for not further developing NATO-Israel relations. These statements and concrete progress may reflect the understanding that the European contingent of the Atlantic community appreciates the need to take steps to deepen political and institutional relations with Israel without explicitly assigning preconditions related to the peace process.

While the aforementioned positions are not yet consensual in Europe, Israel could take advantage of the opportunities they create by pursuing an ambitious strategy that could offer it a stake in the Euroatlantic community, thereby providing itself the most fundamental of international political association and strategic guarantees. The recently concluded NATO-Israel ICP could provide the essential springboard for pursuing such a strategy.

The *de facto* NATO-Israeli Partnership

Upon reflection, though, the track record of the past twelve to eighteen months in NATO-Israel relations presents mixed results. The obvious highlight is the conclusion of the new NATO-Israel ICP. Also, the practical profile of the relationship has been enhanced substantially with unprecedented Israeli participation in NATO activities. Nonetheless, both the institutional framework and the possibilities for practical cooperation fall short of Israeli expectations, and arguably, also of that of some NATO allies.

Cooperation between NATO and Israel first developed within the framework of the multilateral Mediterranean Dialogue (Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania and Algeria). Initially, marginalized and limited to official-level meetings, only in 2002 did bilateral meetings between NATO and the individual countries take place. However, actual cooperation was limited mostly to the multilateral framework.

10 On the role and performance of the European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian issue, particularly on relations with the United States, see Martin Ortega (ed.) “The European Union and the Crisis in the Middle East”, Chaillot Papers, no. 62, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, July 2003.

11 NATO Deputy Secretary General, Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, speaking at an international conference held at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, October 24, 2006, available at www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/so61023a.htm.

12 Ambassador Marc Otte, European Union Special Representative to the Middle East Peace Process, speaking at an international conference held at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, October 26, 2004.

13 Oded Eran, “Israel and Europe Must Nurture Détente”, Financial Times, December 16, 2005.

But, while Israel considered itself a natural partner for NATO, it was nonetheless restricted to the joint agenda of the other Mediterranean Dialogue countries, some of which from the outset were not interested in the enhancement of NATO's presence in the area. The ICP is meant to reduce the current restrictions imposed by the multilateral framework, while preserving it.

The turning point in NATO's attitude to the region and the Mediterranean Dialogue can be traced back to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. NATO's Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, stated repeatedly that most of the threats currently facing the Alliance originate from the Broader Middle East. Therefore, the level of cooperation within the Mediterranean Dialogue should be expanded. This stance was officially expressed at the 2004 Istanbul Summit. In the Istanbul Communiqué, NATO leaders announced their desire to transform the Mediterranean Dialogue into a "genuine partnership". The official status of the Mediterranean Dialogue, however, remained a framework for cooperation.

The idea of utilizing the Istanbul Communiqué to establish bilateral relations between Israel and NATO came during a visit of a delegation of the AFI and GMF shortly after the Istanbul Summit to NATO Headquarters in September 2004. At a meeting with NATO's Secretary General, a senior NATO official encouraged those present to ensure that Israel be the first country to submit an individual cooperation program. Following this meeting Israel submitted a formal proposal for a cooperation program in January 2005 and negotiations between both parties started later that year.

Israel and NATO concluded the first ever ICP in October 2006. Israel is the first country outside of the Euroatlantic arena, and the first among NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue countries, to conclude such an agreement. Yet, at the formal meeting marking the new agreement, the Ambassador representing Israel in NATO revealed that the final outcome fell short of Israel's expectations noting that *"Israel and NATO are natural partners and this agreement formalizes at least some of this partnership. The potential is vast and we have not concealed our desire for an upgrade that will enable a more robust realization of this potential."*¹⁴

In the ICP, Israel stated that building on the experience to be gained from this new mechanism, it will examine, along with NATO, the possibility for establishing a partnership between Israel and NATO. An official partnership would constitute a formal upgrading of Israel's stature within the organization, equal to that of the European non-member partners of NATO. The wording of the statement was a compromise, reflecting the reluctance of some NATO allies towards a more concrete declaration by Israel stating that it seeks a full and official partnership. Israel also announced that one of its objectives is to contribute to NATO's collective effort in confronting the threats facing both parties including terrorism and the proliferation of non-conventional weapons and their means of delivery.

The ICP essentially institutionalizes Israel's ability to deepen the already burgeoning bilateral cooperation it has shared with NATO since mid 2004:

- Israel participated in NATO naval maneuvers in the Black Sea and NATO infantry exercises in Ukraine (sending a platoon from the Golani Brigade);
- Shortly before finalizing the ICP, NATO and Israel reached an agreement on the modalities for Israel's contribution to NATO's naval counter-terrorism operation in

¹⁴ Cited in Itamar Eichner, "Join Golani and Fly to Europe," *Yediot Ahronot*, October 20, 2006, p.6 (in Hebrew).

the Mediterranean Sea (Operation Active Endeavour), stationing an Israeli naval officer at the Operation's headquarters in Naples, Italy;

- Israel previously announced its intentions to place its Home Front Command Search and Rescue unit at NATO's disposal for civilian emergencies;
- Israel joined the NATO cataloguing system. The agreement, signed in June 2006, grants Israel associate membership in the system and full membership within three years. The NATO cataloguing (codification) system is designed to create a uniform framework of inventory and equipment for all NATO allies.

The ICP is broad-ranging and creates a framework that allows for expansion of the scope of current cooperation. Detailing twenty-seven areas of cooperation, the ICP includes response to terrorism, intelligence sharing, armament cooperation and management, nuclear, biological and chemical defense, military doctrine and exercises, civilian emergency plans and disaster preparedness.

The ICP presents an unprecedented opportunity to enhance practical and mutually beneficial cooperation between Israel and NATO. Israel should make the most of this opening. Notwithstanding, Israel should not view enhanced relations with NATO as an end in itself. This would reflect the somewhat prevalent and conservative approach in Israel and elsewhere that focuses mainly on practical military benefits, important as they may be. NATO, however, is not just a military alliance. It is also a multilateral political institution, where negotiation, clubbing and networking are increasingly more important. Moreover, NATO's Secretary General, supported by the United States and Germany, is leading the effort to resurrect NATO as the main political forum of the Atlantic community, focusing to a large extent on the Broader Middle East. Israel should, therefore, consider and approach enhancing relations with NATO as a building-block in forging a new multilateral relationship between Israel and a transformed Euroatlantic community. The ICP may also enhance Israel's capacity to influence NATO's agenda.

The Road Ahead: Formal Partnership with a Transformed NATO

Enhancing Israel's partnership with NATO within the Mediterranean Dialogue and ICP frameworks is necessary, but not sufficient for anchoring Israel to the Euroatlantic community. In other words, Israel should aspire to a partnership *de jure*, assuming that NATO achieves its stated objective of transforming the Alliance politically and militarily. Israel has a vital interest in NATO insofar as it remains relevant and effective as an alliance.

Israel has already stated publicly its desire to pursue a formal partnership. In a groundbreaking public statement, Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tzipi Livni, announced that Israel seeks to be included in NATO's official partnership framework, the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

While it is commonly known that Israel is currently ineligible to become a NATO member and accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, it is maybe less well known that Israel is not even eligible to join NATO's official partnership framework.¹⁵ More importantly, NATO is still officially governed by the 1999 Strategic Concept that confines it to the seemingly less relevant geographic frontiers of the European continent alone. These are useful illustrations of the current strategic and institutional out-datedness of NATO frameworks. Arguably, the Alliance's inability to sustain and deliver on transformation does not enhance the case for closer relations between Israel and NATO.

It appears that to tackle the challenges of the 21st Century and the principal threats posed by radical Islam, terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, NATO must undergo a conceptual transformation. This in itself would redefine the geographical parameters of the Alliance, placing it on functional-strategic and value-based foundations. A new Strategic Concept and operational agenda will enable much greater efficiency in marshalling capacities, capabilities, and resources and in adjusting those to specific objectives and needs on a global basis rather than on a narrow continental basis. When such a conceptual rearrangement takes place, the concept of membership and partnership will also take a new shape and meaning, as will the idea of interoperability. There might be additional added value in such a transformation because it could eliminate, at least partially, the conflict with the EU's ESDP.

This reasoning also forms the basis of the platform put forward by former Spanish Prime Minister, José María Aznar, in a report entitled "NATO: An Alliance for Freedom". In his treatise, President Aznar advocated that NATO should become the security provider for the entire Western world and should promote democracy and freedom. As part of a total reconfiguration of the Alliance to tackle current strategic threats, President Aznar suggested to invite Israel, Australia and Japan to join. Noteworthy, a senior U.S. official also recently argued that NATO should become the "core of the Global Democratic Security Community."¹⁶

Despite its somewhat over-ambitious nature, President Aznar's report has set the tone of the debate over the next step in pursuing NATO's transformation. In this respect, it appears that the upcoming Summit in Riga will discuss NATO's military transformation and the capabilities issue, particularly mindful of Afghanistan. Another important issue, relevant to President Aznar's report and this discussion, is that NATO must tackle the framework for its partnerships. At the very least, most NATO allies, and surely the NATO international staff, recognize the problematic nature of NATO's current partnerships. The out-dated geographical underpinning that lumps together advanced democratic Western nations with developing Central Asian countries in the PFP is no less odd than the grouping of Israel with a non-Mediterranean African country in the Mediterranean Dialogue or than affording the same status to both Australia and China.

NATO partnerships should be designed on a case by case, functional, flexible and tailored basis, so as to best serve both NATO's goals and missions and the partners' interests and capabilities. A new institutional and strategic conceptual framework, will allow NATO partners to contribute much more than they are asked or willing to do at present. This was the conceptual underpinning of the ambitious agenda of the U.S.-

¹⁵ Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty invites "any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty". According to Article 12 of the Basic Document of the Euroatlantic Partnership Council that governs the PFP, it is only open to accession to OSCE Participating States. Israel is an OSCE Partner for Cooperation.

¹⁶ Daniel Fried, "European and Eurasian Affairs", E Journal USA, available at <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0906/ijpe/europe.htm>.

UK “Food for Thought” on “Global Partnerships” that also seeks to bring Australia, Japan and New Zealand closer to the Alliance. While the U.S.-UK agenda will not be fully achieved in Riga, it is rather clear that in the next few years NATO will have to remake the framework for its partnerships.

Within such a new framework Israel, along with other NATO partners, would be far more interested in nurturing partnerships with the Alliance. The recognition that Israel and NATO are “natural allies” can fully materialize when both sides not only acknowledge, but are also willing to invest in moving this relationship ahead, something both have yet to do. Such a relationship would necessitate a willingness on NATO’s part to formalize Israel’s status. This is not just a ceremonial decision as it would also require the Allies’ willingness to associate Israel to activities and frameworks, hitherto, closed to it.

Yet the burden for further development and formalization of Israel’s relations with NATO rests equally upon Israel showing willingness and putting forward concrete commitments to invest and share military, human, technical and financial resources. Israel could have been more forthcoming in its commitments to consign assets to NATO within the ICP. As suggested by the NATO Deputy Secretary General, Israel could assist in NATO’s operations by providing technical teams to support reconstruction efforts. Israel might also be able to provide on occasion strategic airlifting, one of the assets most lacking from NATO’s current capabilities.

The present political circumstances are sufficient to sustain such a relationship, which would be mutually advantageous, considering the common interest, albeit without bringing up more profound issues, the kind which full membership might raise.

Israel's Road to NATO Membership

In their article entitled “Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO?” cited above, Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce Jackson review the pros and cons of Israel’s membership in NATO.¹⁷ The position advocated herein, clearly an Israeli perspective, is that taking into account various considerations, three principles should be met to facilitate Israel’s admission to NATO.

First, Israel should preserve and enhance its bilateral strategic alliance with the United States, irrespective and independent of any relationship with NATO. While NATO membership will *de jure* enhance Israel’s official ally status from non-NATO Ally to NATO Ally, this would manifest that NATO membership does not replace, but rather complements, the special U.S.-Israel relationship. For that matter, opening up Israel’s strategic relations to the multilateral scene should not create, nor lead to, any adverse effects on Israel’s important bilateral relations with European NATO members.

Second, NATO membership does not necessarily connote a loss of independent strategic freedom of action. Multilateral organizations and alliances limit certain capabilities and options, but do not eliminate them. Israel is able to defend itself and capable

¹⁷ Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce Jackson, op cit.

of maintaining a deterrent posture, though NATO membership may indeed enhance that posture. Therefore, Israel as a self-reliant ally is a valuable strategic asset rather than a liability. Moreover, the strategic understandings between the United States and Israel, which were formulated between then-Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Clinton and subsequently ratified by their successors, including President Bush's letter of commitment from April 2004, successfully anchor Israel's right to defend itself on its own.¹⁸

Third, NATO membership will be the institutional-political foundation of Israel's alignment with the Euroatlantic community, and reflect a substantial strategic and diplomatic improvement in its relations with the European Union.

The foremost example, a country that incorporates all three principles in its international positioning and strategic posture, is the United Kingdom. It maintains the closest possible strategic relationship with the United States. They share exclusive strategic relations and intelligence exchanges administered by official agreements.¹⁹ These unique and exclusive relations have weathered the United Kingdom's integration into the European Union and participation in the evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy, while reserving independent capabilities. As noted above, conventional wisdom has it that British integration into the European Union has increased its strategic value for the United States. Moreover, these three principles are the main sources of Britain's contemporary international power and role.

At this stage however, the majority of Alliance members will be reluctant, if not object, to offering membership to a country that is still at war. The discussions within the framework of the GMF-AFI network have indicated two possible scenarios that could "open NATO's door" to Israel.²⁰ The first scenario, as part of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, NATO membership would be offered to Israel as a security assurance. This scenario is regrettably beyond reach at this point in time. Nonetheless, most Europeans engaged in the GMF-AFI network have pointed out that when a comprehensive peace is reached, Israel's place in NATO and the Euroatlantic community should be at the very least seriously considered.

The second, and currently more relevant scenario, is the nuclearization of Iran. The basic idea held by some Americans and Europeans is that since the Atlantic community would most likely defend Israel from an Iranian nuclear threat, it would be only logical to ratify this commitment explicitly and unambiguously by admitting Israel to NATO.²¹ This idea was echoed by former Italian Defense Minister, Antonio Martino, who stated, "*In the light of the serious and worrying Iranian position the time has come to think of admitting Israel into NATO, so that an eventual attack against Israel would be regarded as an attack against the whole of NATO.*" In this sense, it is possible that NATO could contribute to regional stability. Should such an offer present itself, Israel would have to consider whether this would provide it with an additional layer of deterrence above and beyond its current level.²²

18 Uzi Arad, "Is Israel Headed for NATO?" YnetNews, February 1, 2006, available at http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2151nato_uzi.pdf.

19 Those include the 1948 UK-USA Agreement and the secret 1958 US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement.

20 Ronald D. Asmus, "Contain Iran: Admit Israel to NATO", Washington Post, February 21, 2006, p. A15.

21 Ronald D. Asmus, op cit.

22 Uzi Arad, "Israel en route to a Defense Pact?" Ynetnews, October 25, 2006.

Conclusion

The Euroatlantic community is Israel's natural habitat and logical neighborhood. This is the fundamental premise for the arguments set out above. While the Atlantic community bears a considerable burden of responsibility for achieving the above objectives, Israel should assertively state its long-term objectives *vis-à-vis* the Euroatlantic community. Senior Israeli decision-makers are becoming more actively interested in these issues, an impressively positive development. The ICP with NATO is an important step in the right direction. However, Israel has yet to devise a comprehensive, explicit and long-term Euroatlantic strategy.

While senior officials have played an important role so far, so has the GMF-AFI unofficial network. This network has been instrumental in increasing policy awareness of NATO-Israel relations, and in enhancing Israel's relations with the Euroatlantic community. The discussions that the GMF-AFI relationship has fostered have led to an understanding that positioning or anchoring Israel in the Euroatlantic community could be a considerable contribution to regional stability and to the peace process. In this sense, this network can account for the increasing importance of unofficial networks for international governance. As Anne-Marie Slaughter argues, this is a new world order. Israel should recognize this new multilateral order and engage with it.²³

²³ Anne-Marie Slaughter, *op cit.*

WHAT DO THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES WANT FROM NATO?

Abdulaziz O. Sager

A Meager Scorecard

When NATO announced its Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) in July 2004 to promote practical cooperation with the countries of the broader Middle East beginning with the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), the initiative was greeted by the Arab Gulf states with a mixture of interest and suspicion.¹ On the one hand, the rapidly evolving and volatile security environment in the Gulf region certainly provided an opportunity for outside actors to get involved and to encourage and enact reform. The GCC has been on the look out for alternative approaches to escape the inherent instability of the past three decades. NATO potentially represented an alternative. On the other hand, the initiative being put forward within the framework of NATO has been perceived in negative terms as being no more than a mechanism by which the West can continue to control the region. With the reputation of the United States in the Gulf deteriorating rapidly, NATO was perceived as a wolf in sheep's clothing or as a new package for Western policies of the past. How NATO could help launch the region into a new security era remained undefined.

Two years later, very little has changed. While four of the GCC States, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, have in the meantime officially joined the initiative, and while the time since the 2004 Istanbul Summit has seen a flurry of activity in terms of numerous meetings and conferences as well as visits by NATO officials, including the Secretary General for the first time², the precise nature of the relationship between NATO and the GCC, as well as the concrete policy initiatives to

¹ For more information on the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), the Istanbul Summit meeting and the various communiqués and speeches, see www.nato.int

² The Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer visited the Gulf in December 2005 and the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, has been to the region on numerous occasions beginning in December 2004. See reports by the Oman News Agency, December 16, 2004 and in *The Peninsula* (Qatar), December 16, 2004, *Gulf Today* (UAE), September 27, 2005 and *The Peninsula* (Qatar), May 9, 2006.

be implemented, have not developed beyond generalities and broad concepts.³ Terms such as dialogue and partnership remain vague and the uncertainty and confusion about the actual aims and objectives of the ICI have not been overcome. The emphasis on the importance of partnership and the determination to promote different areas for security coordination have not translated into broad and comprehensive strategic approaches that could lead to clear-cut frameworks at the practical and tactical level. While the two sides argue for the enhancement of regional security in light of the existing and potential challenges that may threaten the stability of the region as a whole, a detailed list of priorities that would lead one down this road remains the missing piece of the puzzle.

Given this reality, the following considerations attempt to shed some light on the requirements of the GCC states and focus on those aspects of the relationship with NATO that need to be worked on in order to overcome the shortcomings of the recent past. The purpose is to identify areas of future cooperation that could receive a positive response from NATO and outline steps the Alliance needs to take in order to allow proposals to become policies. By analyzing the real requirements of the GCC states in terms of defense and security, it is possible to formulate suggestions more concretely. Such suggestions can then be used as a joint platform for cooperation and partnership between the two sides at both the bilateral (1+1) as well as collective (1+6) level.

What is the Basis of the Relationship between NATO and the GCC?

Underlying the Istanbul Summit meeting of 2004 was the core belief that security and regional stability could be enhanced through a new transatlantic engagement with the region. A combination of factors led to such an assessment, including the continuing volatility of the Gulf which has led the region from one crisis to the next over the past three decades, current challenges in the form of mounting instability in Iraq, a potential crisis looming over the nuclear program of Iran as well as the broader threat of terrorism which had placed its defining stamp on the global security environment with the events of September 11, 2001.

³ Among the conferences that have been organized are the following: a meeting held in Doha, Qatar, on April 19 to 20, 2004 entitled NATO Transformation and Gulf Security which was sponsored by Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with the RAND Corporation of the United States; a meeting on NATO and the Broader Middle East Region in Rome, Italy, in March 2005 to discuss in more detail the potential areas of cooperation between NATO and the GCC states; Promoting Cooperation and Fostering Relations: NATO-Gulf Relations in the Framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative organized in cooperation with the Gulf Research Center; NATO, the Greater Middle East and the Role of Parliamentarians, held in Doha, Qatar, on December 1, 2005 followed by a second conference on the strategic security of the Gulf held in Bahrain on December 3, 2005; and finally The Future of NATO, the Mediterranean and the Greater Middle East held in London on September 11 to 12, 2006 in order to evaluate the accomplishments of the ICI. See the report by Dr. Haila Hamad Al-Mekaimi, Head of the Euro-Gulf Research Unit at Kuwait University in Al-Qabas (Kuwait), September 22, 2006.

In order to focus on both underlying causes as well as present challenges, discussions from the perspective of NATO with regard to the GCC states focused on two key aspects of the relationship. On the one side were practical matters such as various civilian and military areas of cooperation, including defense budgets, military planning, joint operations in the fight against terrorism, and monitoring navigation to prevent the flow of WMD material and illegal trafficking in arms. On the other side were considerations of the broader regional security scene within the context of the overall changes taking place security-wise, and trying to combine these concepts with the factors that influence the developments and transitions in the region.

It is in regard to the second aspect that NATO has spent considerable time emphasizing and explaining the geopolitical transformation of the organization and how an evolving NATO can play a role within the Gulf security context. Much of this has emerged out of NATO's own experiences in the wake of the end of the Cold War, including the largely positive and pioneering role it has played as a multinational force, under UN Security Council mandate, implementing the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its contribution to the development of law and order in Eastern Europe (for example, the decommissioning of weapons in Macedonia in 2001 and more importantly, in fostering multi-national security cooperation). In his speech at the December 2005 meeting in Qatar, NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said

"As an organization that has been dealing with multi-national security cooperation for more than half a century, NATO has a wealth of experience to offer to non-NATO countries. Most importantly, over the past decade, we have developed the necessary political and military links with non-NATO countries to make our cooperation very effective. And that is why the new NATO is now in a far better position to make a tangible contribution to security more widely, including to Gulf security."⁴

He, therefore, underscored the numerous roles that the organization could undertake and fulfill.

The reference to the more practical aspects is also grounded in experience, such as the direct dialogue that the North Atlantic Council initiated with some of the Mediterranean non-NATO members back in February 1995 to support the stability of this region and reach better mutual understanding on issues of concern. Then Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Sergio Balanzino, stressed that the Alliance had no intention of getting involved or engaging in efforts to resolve conflicts in the Mediterranean region, demilitarized zones or the provision of economic assistance,⁵ as such matters were best left to the European Union. However, he stated that the Alliance would focus on other issues, including the exchange of information, the war on terrorism and organized crime.

Following the events of September 11, 2001, NATO became closely associated with the campaign against terrorism. In Operation Active Endeavor, elements of NATO's standing naval forces were sent to patrol the Eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping. This was a new role for NATO, which started to adapt to military operations outside Europe for the first time in its history. NATO's forces were subsequently sent to Afghanistan in the wake of the U.S.-led war against the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda in 2002 where

⁴ NATO's Role in Gulf Security, Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at the State of Qatar/NATO/Rand Conference, held on December 1, 2005, available at www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051201a.htm

⁵ Mohamed Al-Sayed Saleem, *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the 21st Century*, Macmillan, London, 2000, pp. 129-146.

the organization was soon entrusted with the task of commanding the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Among its numerous responsibilities, the force is responsible for maintaining law and order, assisting the Afghan authorities to do the same, improving the capabilities of Afghan police and armed forces, opening and running the Kabul International Airport and, finally, ensuring the implementation of the procedures of the protection force. Finally, with regard to Iraq, NATO has offered its assistance to the government of Iraq in relation to the training of security forces and Iraqi army personnel beginning in 2004. NATO has, thus, been coming closer and closer to the Gulf region and taking a more active role.

Cooperation within the ICI framework has been notable with three GCC states: Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait. Representatives from each of these states participated in the 2005 Rome meeting during which the security challenges and regional issues of the Gulf and the Greater Middle East were discussed.⁶ Subsequently, NATO has received high-ranking delegations from Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait to look into two main issues: combating terrorism and force training. This was in line with NATO's intention to support the capabilities and military expertise of the concerned countries by offering training to military and intelligence officers, exchange of information and bilateral cooperation in the fields of crisis management and peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate. By the end of the year, the three mentioned states officially joined the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).⁷ The United Arab Emirates became the fourth member of the ICI during 2006. In October 2005, NATO officials also held talks with their counterparts from Saudi Arabia at NATO's headquarters in Brussels. While the Secretary General of NATO described the talks as useful, successful and fruitful,⁸ Saudi Arabia and Oman have not declared their official intention to join the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

The Need to Resolve Underlying Dilemmas

While NATO officials have steadfastly emphasized the organization's modest objectives and underlined that nothing will be imposed on the region, this is seen within the Gulf as insufficient, especially given the region's volatile security environment. Thus, while one can see from the discussion above that the two sides have been coming closer and have, at least to some degree, undertaken the exploratory work to better define their relationship, the fact that concrete policies remain the exception rather than the rule, hampers the overall movement forward. In order to overcome this problem, a first necessary step is to tackle some of the underlying causes hampering working relationships. Here, three specific areas can be mentioned:

⁶ See, for example, the article by Abdallah Bishara, the former GCC Secretary General, entitled "The GCC Security Dialogues with NATO" published in Al-Bayan Daily newspaper, April 26, 2005 (in Arabic).

⁷ Agence France Presse, June 19, 2005.

⁸ Agence France Presse, October 6, 2005.

Problem Area One: NATO and Regional Security

NATO's involvement with the GCC states through the ICI cannot be decoupled from the rest of the region. This is particularly relevant with regard to opposing parties within the region, such as Iran, where, given current circumstances, an engagement at the regional level will certainly be looked at with a great deal of suspicion and mistrust. Up until now, the Gulf States have not been able to develop a more broad-based and durable security architecture. This is mainly due to three factors: the inability of the regional states to articulate such a vision and engage in an effective dialogue with one another, the failure of European States to actively promote their "soft power" mechanisms to initiate and promote discussions about greater security cooperation and the insistence of the United States on primarily relying on their "hard" military power to try to impose a security solution. If the region is to move towards more cooperative methods of security interaction, it is necessary that this cycle be broken.

The role that NATO can play in the Gulf *vis-à-vis* the main security challenges facing the region is, for the moment, unclear and questions outnumber available answers. Is NATO willing and able to contribute to Iraq's stability over and above training for Iraqi security personnel? What is NATO's policy on the Iranian nuclear program, which, as GCC Secretary General Abdulrahman Al-Attiyah explained at the NATO December 2005 meeting in Doha, is extremely worrisome for the region?⁹ How does NATO fit into the proposed security arrangements relating to the Israeli/Palestinian/Lebanon conflict? In these instances, and despite the fact that NATO's mandate now stretches into Central Asia and Afghanistan, NATO has to better formulate its policies towards the region and specifically look more closely at the impact of Gulf regional events on the overall Middle East security environment. What NATO can do most of all is to help the region define its own security interests and then develop a framework under which those interests can be turned into effective policy instruments. This, however, has to be based on the principle that security in the Gulf is tied to the larger region within which it operates wherein Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict are as much a reality as terrorism and missile proliferation.

NATO's initiative is further constrained by its emphasis on bilateralism. Whereas, the main security challenges in the Gulf cannot be reduced to a single state, ICI does not acknowledge the interdependence and linkages that are clearly evident. This approach contrasts with the fact that NATO's experience is in constructing a multilateral alliance network, burden sharing, as well as in promoting individual country specialization, ultimately leading to a more effective coalition. Günter Altenburg, the former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political and Security Policy, has mentioned that NATO has learned many valuable lessons about creating trust and developing regional security as part of its own transformation and expansion process.¹⁰ This is something that needs to become more apparent. Current bilateral arrangements have been entered into because there is agreement on the perceived threat and there exists a degree of acceptance of the American presence. This is, however, not a sufficiently stable basis from which to expand into a formal regional security structure. Threat perceptions can shift, as can the elite and popular acceptance of an expanded role for a given actor. Moreover, the ICI will not be effective unless it achieves regional coordination among all of the GCC states.

⁹ "Gulf Presses NATO for Nuclear-Free Zone," Agence France Presse, December 3, 2005.

¹⁰ "Original Role of NATO Has Changed in Recent Years", The Peninsula (Qatar), April 20, 2004.

Problem Area Two: NATO and the United States

Within their security concerns, the GCC States face a dilemma. While U.S. military support remains essential, U.S. policies in the region also heighten the security imbalance as underscored by the vulnerabilities that are developing around the war in Iraq and with regard to Iran. As Rami Khouri has succinctly pointed out, the Gulf's "main source of security... is also the main reason for their insecurity."¹¹ At the moment, given the negative perception of NATO that exists in the region, an expansion of its activities would be perceived as the willful expansion of U.S. dominance under a multilateral, but still Western, umbrella. This is counterproductive and will have a negative impact in moving the region in the direction of some form of security cooperation. NATO's presence, therefore, must primarily create a broader role for European actors in Gulf security matters. In addition, NATO has to prove its independence from the policies of the U.S. by showing that it is a security actor in its own right. Yet, it is equally essential that the ICI is given full political support by all twenty-six member states of NATO to implement relevant programs and that NATO, as an organization, speaks with one single voice. Here, the United States should take the lead and ensure that NATO can operate in such an independent manner.

Problem Area Three: Overcoming NATO's Negative Image

It remains a fact that NATO has a negative image in the Gulf region, an image it has not managed to overcome. Perceptions of NATO vary from NATO as a U.S. bull-in-a-China shop, to fair weather friend but not true ally, to NATO as a cover under which the GCC States are forced to buy expensive military equipment that they really do not need.¹² While on the elite level, the image might be more positive and the tendency might be towards expanded cooperation, this is certainly not the case among the general public.

Suspicious about the organization's objectives have not been overcome and there is an urgent need to create a basis of trust between the two sides. As Mustafa Alani has stated in NATO Review,

*"Until NATO is able to... overcome the negative image it has in the Middle East, the Alliance has little prospect of ever playing a constructive role in the region."*¹³

With policies being prejudged, it is all the more necessary to put forward programs that are both for the benefit of the Gulf states and which produce pragmatic and immediate results. Here, it would be useful to get away from the notion that cooperation will only develop "over time" and that the process will have to be drawn-out. For one, the Gulf region does not have the luxury of time in terms of the security challenges it faces. Tangible progress towards improving the current situation needs to be more immediate. Second, delaying action until some unspecified period in the future will not allay the misperceptions common in the region and will only allow the negative image of NATO to fester.

11 Rami G. Khouri, "In Qatar, A Frank Look at the Dilemmas of Gulf Security", Daily Star (Lebanon), November 30, 2005.

12 These were some of the comments voiced at the meeting of NATO and the Gulf Research Center entitled Promoting Cooperation and Fostering Relations: NATO-Gulf relations in the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, held in Dubai (United Arab Emirates) on September 26, 2005. More information about the meeting is available on both the NATO (www.nato.int) and Gulf Research Center (www.grc.ae) websites.

13 Mustafa Alani, "Arab Perspectives of NATO", NATO Review, Winter 2005, p. 52.

What the Gulf Wants from NATO

If more attention is paid to some of the problem issues identified above, the subsequent effort to make ICI work will be all the easier. Nevertheless, if the relationship is to work, it is absolutely essential that a clear and detailed list, outlining the requirements and the limitations of each side and the possible risks and challenges that their cooperation may face, be worked out. Despite the numerous obstacles that have been encountered so far, the GCC States are still looking for a strong and effective relationship with NATO from which a firm platform for joint practical defense and security programs can be developed. The basis for such a partnership has to revolve around two main components: establishing a comprehensive view of security in the Gulf region and developing an appropriate formula for practical cooperation that is compatible with the existing relations between the GCC and other countries around the world.

NATO has distinct contributions it can offer the region and the ICI does offer new opportunities. Its knowledge and practice in constructing a multilateral alliance network, burden sharing, as well as promoting individual country specialization, ultimately leading to a more effective coalition, is unprecedented and of direct utility for the GCC countries. But the GCC States do not want the ICI to turn into another nice, politically correct initiative that in the end falls short on substance. As such, the following areas of cooperation are put forward for consideration:

Move from explanation to concrete proposals. It is absolutely essential that NATO overcome the uncertainties and confusion about the objectives of the ICI that currently plague it.¹⁴

Work towards membership in the ICI for Saudi Arabia and Oman. One of the issues raised at past regional meetings has been “coordination” between ICI members. But, it is necessary for all GCC States to sign up to the ICI so that the organization can work with them as a group.

Ensure the success of missions such as Afghanistan as well as put forward suggestions for stabilizing Iraq. Afghanistan and Iraq are the two places that the GCC looks at when making an assessment of NATO’s effectiveness. Unless NATO succeeds there, it will be difficult to convince GCC States that NATO has the ways and means to solve their security dilemmas.

Professional training in terms of civil emergency planning, search-and-rescue missions, peacekeeping, cooperation regarding trafficking and border security. This includes participation in related military-to-military training activities as well as joint training on special force operations such as air landing by paratroopers, airborne assault by commandos and helicopters.

Exchanging training experience and opening the door to GCC participation in NATO training courses in areas such as peacekeeping, military doctrine and defense budgets, in order to establish a baseline of common knowledge, skills and experience for enhancing cooperative military relations. This includes promoting military-to-

¹⁴ This was the consensus reached among the Gulf participants at the September 2005 Dubai meeting, op cit.

military cooperation in the field of military and security planning at the level of higher command, joint staff and general headquarters of defense and security forces.

Coordinating intelligence activities and internal security operations, including the joint operation of various military intelligence systems.

Effective cooperation to improve interoperability of command, control, communication and early warning, whether airborne, naval or ground, in order to improve the tactical and technical performance of staff and personnel.

Broader exchange of information in terms of political and security issues including better conceptual approaches to international terrorism, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. This could include exchange of field experience in areas of joint (land, sea and air) operations against terrorist threats, with divisional and main combat group from GCC States on the one hand and the NATO Response Force on the other, or with any other NATO formations. It also means support for key regional initiatives such as those of the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center for the establishment of a “Gulf Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone” or the sponsorship of workshops on thematic issues.

Coordination in the fields of humanitarian aid, disaster relief, maritime embargo operations and search and rescue missions, including training in the fields of logistics, administration and engineering as a means to improve performance. NATO’s experience like that of offering humanitarian relief in Pakistan during the devastating January 2006 earthquake is one pertinent example.

In order to implement some of the programs listed above, it would be useful to form a joint committee to oversee the implementation process in addition to sub-committees with specializations that can plan and develop joint programs of cooperation and modify them to suit emerging requirements, whenever and wherever necessary.

At the broader strategic level, it would be useful to look at options available that would integrate NATO into the regional security environment. Three proposals can be put forward here, but each would still need to be debated extensively.

NATO-Peninsula Shield Cooperation

The Peninsula Shield defense force, established in 1984 to overcome the Gulf States’ inability to develop an effective individual defense capability has ceased to be a robust collective, deterrent force. To overcome this problem, Saudi Arabia came up with a proposal in December 2005 aimed at restructuring the force on the basis of a centralized command and decentralized deployment. NATO should engage the Saudi Kingdom on this proposal and provide assistance to move discussions along. This could serve as a basis to provide for better collective protection for the member states of the GCC.

Establishment of an Arab Rapid Reaction Force (ARRF)

In line with the development of the twenty-one thousand strong NATO Response Force and the radical overhaul of the organization’s military command structure, NATO can extend its own experience and take the lead in showing how cooperation between the Arab and Gulf States can be structured more effectively. An ARRF would directly correspond to NATO’s need in being able to handle immediate security threats and

developing conflicts. What can be achieved by consequent and quick reaction to the development of a crisis was made clear by NATO's intervention in Macedonia in 2003. In addition, it would ultimately provide a competent natural partner on the Arab side speaking the same language and understanding the necessary operational requirements. This, in turn, would allow both sides to more effectively handle cooperation relating to the threats posed by global terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the illicit trade in drugs and weapons.

GCC Membership in NATO

Based on the experience of NATO and its subsequent success in widening its membership to include new countries, the GCC's membership would bring about a more effective and structured defense organization. Such an organization would create the necessary conditions for member countries to benefit from the security protection umbrella that it will provide for its members. Ultimately, the organization could be expanded beyond the current borders northward (Turkey) where it will stop at the Northern latitude of Iraq, Iran and Syria.

Conclusion

The slow progress in the partnership between the GCC States and NATO over the past three years has led to a certain down turn in enthusiasm and interest among several of the GCC States. As long as too much time is spent on abstract ideas and theoretical matters, without any "roadmap" for practical implementation, there is little prospect of the cooperation becoming tangible and useful. While NATO has a role to play, it must be remembered that the role also involves a political component and that, at the outset, it is a complementary, rather than a central, one. At the same time, NATO cannot afford to ignore the Gulf region, and if structured correctly, the organization will find willing partners in the GCC States to make the relationship mutually beneficial and lasting.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR NATO: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE

Jeffrey Grey

The changes wrought by the end of the Cold War and the new global disorder reflected in the “War on Terror” will continue to shape traditional security arrangements among democratic nations. Older patterns of thought and behavior will undergo revision, and the security architecture that has served Western interests from the early Cold War will face challenges that its architects did not envisage and did not plan for.

In the half-century during which the Cold War was fought and won by the West, Australian interests and commitments diverged from those of Western Europe in all but the most general of senses. Australia is a middle power with a European heritage formed through the Judeo-Christian tradition, Western and liberal-democratic in its orientation, but with an increasingly diverse multi-cultural population and with key determinants of its security policies governed by geography and its location at the foot of Southeast Asia. The foundation of its security and foreign policies has been, and remains, the alliance with the United States underpinned by the provisions of the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty of 1951. The decolonization of Europe’s Asian empires resulted in a loosening of security ties between Australia and the major European states in the post-1945 world, including Britain, as a result of the latter’s withdrawal from “East of Suez” and its concentration on European affairs through membership in NATO and, ultimately, the European Community.

The following considerations will look at the history of security interactions between Australia and “the rest of the West” before engaging with recent developments in that relationship consequent upon involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the global war on terror. Possible implications and future developments arising from the new institutional directions that NATO faces are then considered.

As a former colony and self-governing Dominion of the British Empire, Australia played an important contributing role in the two great European wars of the 20th century. Especially between 1916 and 1918, when the Australian Imperial Force was deployed to the Western Front, Australian soldiers enjoyed regular interaction with French and Belgian civilians and, less frequently, with the French and Belgian militaries. In the Second World War, Australians fought with and against the French in Syria. In the Pacific War, the Dutch forces in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) supported British and Australian forces in Malaya and Singapore and then, when the Japanese conquered the NEI by the middle of 1942, operated from Australia alongside Australian and U.S. forces until victory in 1945. In the early postwar period, the Australian government became a leading advocate of the Indonesian nationalist position against the returning Dutch, while it paid limited attention to French difficulties in Indochina, only really becoming involved with Vietnamese affairs during the Diem regime. Defense relations with Britain increasingly emphasized security in Southeast Asia, and from the mid-

1950s the old emphasis on an Australian (and New Zealand) force contribution to the Middle East and the Mediterranean was abandoned.

More important than the legacy of direct military interaction between Australia and Europe for the consideration of any increased NATO-Australian relations are the twin characteristics of alliance behavior and defense of the national interest beyond immediate territorial bounds. Throughout its history, Australia has always acted within an alliance framework, Imperial with the British and quasi-imperial with the Americans. The global war on terror has re-emphasized the strategic alliance with the United States, to the extent that following the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, invoked article four of ANZUS which declares that an attack on either party may be regarded as an attack on both, in the same manner as the European partners invoked the North Atlantic Treaty. He stated *“Australia stands ready to cooperate within the limits of its capability concerning any response that the United States may regard as necessary in consultation with her allies”*.

A theme laced continually through Australian security debates in the course of the 20th century pitches those who espouse the direct defense of Australian territory against those who believe that Australian national interests should be defended regardless of where they are threatened. For most of its history this has meant that Australia has either fought, or undertaken to fight, in defense of common interests with alliance partners in often-distant parts. In the Cold War this was characterized as “forward defense”, and although the defeat in Vietnam in the early 1970s saw a renewed emphasis on “continental defense” of the Australian mainland this posture eroded rapidly in the latter half of the 1990s. Even before the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Australian government showed its willingness to reflect these two traditions in security policy, notably through creating and leading the coalition of regional and other partners that participated in the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) in East Timor in 1999 to 2000.

The shift in the security environment since 2001 further underlines the point that “homeland defense” and a capacity and willingness to fight “anywhere and everywhere” if needed are no longer, if they ever were, “either/or” propositions. Equally, the security arrangements that worked so well during the Cold War may no longer be appropriate or sufficient for dealing with a new and very different enemy and a range of threats on a global scale. The Bush administration’s initial apparent preference for short-term “coalitions of the willing” over larger, more ponderous multilateral alliance partnerships has not been sustained into the President’s second term, and it seems reasonable to think that the United States will continue to use traditional alliance structures as vehicles for the promotion and defense of broader U.S. and Western interests.

The nature, composition and purpose of those alliances will change, however, and fundamentally. The U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, stated explicitly, in January 2006, that NATO is to become *“first and foremost a political alliance devoted to strengthening and defending our democratic values at home and around the world”*.

This will involve the creation of a “globally deployable military force”, a “common collective deployment at strategic distances”, and the Alliance is to be broadened to include other democratic allies of the United States such as Japan and Australia

in some form of “advanced partnerships”.¹ Nuland’s was merely the most recent contribution along these lines to a debate that has been in train for at least a decade.² Others have advocated the abandonment of NATO’s traditional transatlantic character and the opening of its ranks to “*any democratic state in the world that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfillment of NATO’s new responsibilities*”.³

Concern that NATO had no further useful purpose after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and would wither and die of its own accord, has been overtaken by the fear that NATO is stretched meeting the variety of tasks presented to it since the mid-1990s and the intervention in the former Yugoslavia. As NATO forces have deployed, of necessity, further afield on what were formally “out of area” tasks, such as in Afghanistan or in Darfur, they find themselves operating alongside or in support of forces from non-NATO partners, such as Japan, Australia and South Korea. Indeed, the new security agenda has already placed Australian forces in some new and unexpected situations, such as providing force protection for the six hundred-strong engineering unit from the Japanese Self-Defense Force in Southern Iraq.

The new direction in relations between Australia and NATO was first flagged in May 2004 when Alexander Downer delivered the first address by an Australian foreign minister to the North Atlantic Council, followed by a joint press conference with the Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.⁴ Downer argued that international security “is indivisible” in a world of failed and failing states, international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Having noted NATO’s development and widening membership since the end of the Cold War, he then listed in some detail the trends and existing and emerging threats in the Asia-Pacific region confronting Australia, most of which in fact had little application outside that region except in a generic sense and was careful to speak of a “partnership” between the two sides rather than anything more specific or formal. In the view of the Australian government, strengthened cooperation with NATO was something it was “keen to pursue” through heightened consultations on a range of issues, a proposed information security agreement (successfully negotiated and signed in 2005), and through what Downer described as “more structured frameworks for cooperation” in the fullness of time.

Australia has enjoyed membership of technical committees and has worked at a relatively low level with NATO for some time, but as Downer observed in the press conference afterwards, “the relationship between Australia and NATO didn’t amount to much” during the Cold War. Equipment compatibility and the general interoperability of forces have been the key issues for Australia, with the emphasis very much on the forces of the United States and the United Kingdom. Downer’s visit to the Council and de Hoop Scheffer’s reciprocal visit to Australia in April 2005, the first visit by the organization’s Secretary General, clearly signaled interest in raising the level of cooperation and activity on both sides. Accordingly, during the visit the Australian Minister for Defense, Senator Robert Hill, announced that under a new agreement Australia would post a defense attaché to NATO Headquarters in Brussels to help “improve communications

1 Financial Times, London, January 24, 2006.

2 An early and detailed analysis of the basis for an expanded NATO with responsibilities and missions outside Europe and in a global partnership to defend Western interests is provided by Ronald D. Asmus, Robert D. Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Can NATO Survive?” in *The Washington Quarterly*, 19:2, 1996.

3 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO”, *Foreign Affairs*, 85:5, September-October 2006.

4 “Enhanced cooperation with NATO in a New Security Environment”, May 19, 2004, accessed at http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2004/040519_nato.html.

in the war on terrorism”.⁵ A further sign of developing cooperation came in July 2006 with the dispatch of an Australian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Afghanistan, to be integrated into a larger Dutch unit that would in turn provide force protection. Australian Special Forces soldiers have been operating in Afghanistan under NATO command in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), but in discrete units.

Increasingly, “NATO is everywhere”, as Jean-Yves Hine of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London has noted with pardonable exaggeration.⁶ What does this mean in practical terms and what are the benefits and the implications of greater cooperation with the transatlantic organization for non-NATO parties like Australia?

The type and level of cooperation that Australia currently undertakes, over which everyone is in broad agreement, often extends from pre-existing agreements with individual NATO members, chiefly the United States and the United Kingdom. Broadening these to cover common efforts against terrorism, illegal immigration and the spread of pandemic diseases such as avian flu, involving greater cooperation and interaction between law enforcement agencies and embodying a “whole of government” approach, is generally uncontroversial. Some of this involves Australia and NATO members in non-NATO instrumentalities such as INTERPOL. It is much less clear that heightened security cooperation of the kind envisioned by senior figures in the Bush administration, such as Ambassador Nuland, involving a potential expansion of NATO membership through the abolition or substantial modification of article ten of the North Atlantic Treaty, is either politically possible or desirable.

Greater security cooperation with NATO would clearly carry some positive benefits for the Australian government, allowing it to be seen legitimately as more of a global player and enabling greater access to intelligence-sharing arrangements, though here again there are pre-existing mechanisms such as the United Kingdom-United States-Australia (UKUSA) agreement. In Afghanistan currently, the existing agreements and command and control and chain of command issues seem to work well in coordinating the activities of the Australians deployed there as part of ISAF, which has involved heavy and sustained combat through the middle months of 2006, and before. The next campaigning season that is foreseen to begin with the springthaw in March or April 2007, is likely to see further protracted, high intensity conventional combat, especially in the Southern provinces, and it may be that more formal and more extensive arrangements are needed under such circumstances. It should be noted, however, that the Australian Special Forces are being withdrawn and there are, at present, no plans to recommit them in the near future. The recent, current and projected likely commitments for the Australian Defense Force within ISAF do not suggest any significant shortcomings in the way in which the “in the field” relationship with NATO is currently handled.

There are potential downsides to more formalized Australian involvement in NATO. Australia has spent decades building bridges within its region (broadly defined), from the Colombo Plan beginning in the 1950s through the Whitlam government’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the abolition of restrictions on immigration based on race or ethnicity (the notorious “White Australia” policy adopted by the first Federal parliament in 1901, which was dismantled in the late 1960s). In more recent decades, and especially during the Hawke-Keating Labor governments between 1983 and 1996, there has been a concerted push to integrate Australia more

5 Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Australian Defense College, Canberra, April 1, 2005 accessed at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s05041b.htm>.

6 <http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/april2006/nato-debates-australian-partnership>.

securely within its region, especially within Southeast Asia. This has been attended by considerable success in some areas, but there remains deep underlying suspicion and ignorance of Australian intentions, both at the official and the popular levels within various Southeast Asian countries. While the more extreme critique and outright insults proffered by the former Malaysian prime minister, Dr Mahathir bin Mohamed, are not representative, they nonetheless give an indication of the tensions and hostilities that bedevil Australia's relationship with at least some member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). High-profile engagement with NATO would simply confirm what the more extreme critics of Australia's position in Asia already profess to believe, and would certainly be utilized by Islamist Jihadist organizations in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and elsewhere in their propaganda attacks on Australia specifically, and Western interests more generally. This is not insignificant in terms of recruiting for terrorist organizations like Jemaah Islamiah, the perpetrators of the Bali bombings in 2002.

Opinion in Australia is divided over the potential impact of closer integration in NATO on perceptions in Beijing, and the relationship with the PRC is another of the crucial issues facing Canberra for the coming 25 years.⁷ Australia and the United States already differ on some aspects of the relationship, especially since President Bush took office. Future Chinese intentions towards Taiwan remain the major area of divergence and Canberra tends to emphasize the opportunities presented by the "rise" of China rather than seeing this solely in terms of strategic-level challenges or threats. Beijing has issued various veiled warnings about the closeness of Australian-American policy under ANZUS in the event of a crisis in the Straits of Formosa and it is reasonable to conclude that the leadership in Beijing would view an increasing closeness with NATO in a similar light, especially if it seemed to imply a greater European or Western involvement in Asian affairs.

In any case, it is difficult to see a role for NATO in Asia in any foreseeable future. The legacy of colonialism and the anti-colonial struggle is still strong culturally and symbolically in domestic politics. Governments in China, South Korea and throughout Southeast Asia react negatively to talk of an enhanced role for the Japanese military in the post-September 11 region, reflecting popular memory of the brutality of Japanese occupation. Suggestions of a closer engagement between NATO and Japan, which has sparked debate in that country between those who see Japan's strategic policy as best focused on the United States and those who want to see a lessening of that relationship, might prompt similarly negative reactions in the region, although it would have fewer implications for Japan's relationship with Australia. While it has not been put to the test in recent decades, there seems little reason to imagine that the reappearance of European military power in the Asia-Pacific region would be any more welcome than a resurgent Japanese presence and would provide further opportunities for successful Islamist Jihadist proselytizing among the dispossessed and disadvantaged in those societies. In addition, a change of government in Australia, though not likely in the near future, would see greater emphasis on the primacy of regional concerns from a newly-elected Labor government. This would not rule out further collaboration with NATO in Afghanistan, for example, where Labor has said it is committed to remaining, but would almost certainly see a withdrawal of Australian forces from Iraq in favor of securing Australian interests closer to Australia's shores.

⁷ "Partnership with NATO could hold pros and cons for Australia", April 28, 2006 accessed at <http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=/ForeignBureaus/archive>.

Whilst some have advocated the abandonment or rewriting of article ten of the North Atlantic Treaty to enable the membership of like-minded liberal-democracies outside the mid-Atlantic/European territory, such a move poses as many problems as it does opportunities, if history is any guide. The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) provides a cautionary tale for those who would seek to combine geographically disparate states around an allegedly common purpose. Formed in 1955 through the Treaty of Manila in response to the failure of the Geneva talks and concerns about communist threats in Southeast Asia, it brought together the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines, and (somewhat bizarrely) France and Pakistan. Ostensibly united over the communist Cold War threat, in fact the concerns and interests of member states diverged considerably over time, with both the French and Pakistanis destabilizing SEATO's processes and capacity to react when it became clear that their needs were not reflected in the organization's own, and that other member states would not bend in their direction. When the circumstances for which SEATO had been formed actually arose (successive Laotian crises and the growing war in Indochina) SEATO was hamstrung by differences between its members. The organization was disbanded as an irrelevance in 1973.

SEATO is a warning, not a blueprint. Events may suggest that rather than a single, unwieldy and perhaps unworkable strategic alliance of "Western" interests, a better model may be several, regionally-focused alliances or coalitions acting in tandem as opportunity arises and necessity dictates. The Cold War provides an imperfect example of what this might look like, since NATO was the only truly successful Cold War alliance structure to emerge and face the communist threat while, for a variety of reasons, SEATO and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) proved unequal to the task. At the end of the 1990s, the Clinton administration began to advocate the INTERFET "model" of a regional power at the centre of largely regional coalitions for specific, urgent tasks (such as the intervention in East Timor or peace enforcement and nation building missions for collapsed states in sub-Saharan Africa). The Bush administration moved U.S. policy in different directions, as we have seen, but the idea of aligning regional security coalitions may yet have merit. It could prove more responsive to regional issues and regional sensitivities and minimize the potential for enemy exploitation of Western military involvement in Third World or Islamic contexts. Whilst Downer has observed that security in our times is indivisible, this underplays the different ways in which the global terrorist threat is perceived in a variety of Western states and those other states that are aligned with them (Pakistan is an obvious example). Put simply, for some the threat of Jihadist terror is derived from within, while for those such as the United States it is (thus far) an external phenomenon.

Nor is there universal agreement on the nature of the threat and the best response to it within Western countries, as the Spanish election of 2004 illustrates and the continuing differences in Australia over policy on the war in Iraq should remind us. The more-or-less complete breakdown of relations between the Bush administration and European opinion will need careful rehabilitation and realignment of views and interests between Washington and Europe under the next U.S. administration before any realistic measures can be taken to expand NATO's areas of activity, much less introduce a non-transatlantic membership.⁸

⁸ Ronald D. Asmus, "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance", *Foreign Affairs*, 82:5, September-October 2003 discusses the breakdown in relations and argues for repairing the relationship through changes on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Australian government has offered low-key encouragement to suggestions for greater cooperation with, or within, a redefined NATO, an idea that, nonetheless, seems to have occasioned greater enthusiasm in some quarters of NATO and the Bush administration than it has in Australia. Despite Downer's address to the North Atlantic Council and de Hoop Scheffer's visit to Australia, there has been little public exposure of the proposed closer ties or debate about them. In more than two years since Downer's address, not one of the principle strategic policy think tanks in Australia (a limited number in any case, but including the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre at the Australian National University, the privately-endowed Lowy Institute in Sydney and the government-funded, stand-alone, Australian Strategic Policy Institute) has provided a major analysis of the proposals or their implications for Australian security policy. All continue to produce regular and sustained comment on the strategic relationship with the United States, the region, the global war on terror, the concomitant expansion in the Australian Defense Force and the costs and consequences of "homeland security" initiatives (an additional AUD\$ 2 billion in the two years after the September 11, 2001, attacks alone).

Enhanced ties with NATO apparently have yet to resonate with those outside government circles. This is true of the opposition as well. The Australian Labor Party's shadow minister for Foreign Affairs, Trade and International Security, Kevin Rudd, is a former diplomat and a highly visible and well-informed spokesperson on the issues encompassed by his portfolio responsibilities. He speaks regularly, and at length, on issues confronting Australian security and foreign policy. NATO rarely features in his remarks, except in passing when noting the role of Australian Defense Force units under NATO command in Afghanistan.⁹ In a major public speech in September 2006, asserting a redefined foreign and security policy for Australia under a future Labor government, neither NATO nor a putative Australian role within it received any mention at all.¹⁰

In this overall context, arguments for revised NATO procedures that would allow Australia, or other non-NATO partners, a deliberative role in NATO's political decision-making governing, for example, future operations in Afghanistan or elsewhere, seem rather irrelevant. This is not to suggest that involvement in political and strategic decision-making is not important. Historically, its absence severely tested the Anglo-Australian relationship in the Mediterranean theatre during the Second World War, and Australian governments have worked hard for decades to increase such access and influence within the ANZUS partnership. Practical, less formal and wide-ranging arrangements are favored currently, at least at the official level in Canberra. Given that the key relationship for both Australia and NATO is that with the United States and given that Australian involvement in operations as part of the global war on terror will almost certainly be predicated on U.S. involvement, a focus on NATO decision-making practices perhaps misses the point. To the extent that it can, Australia will seek to exercise influence upon U.S. decision-making processes and the success or failure of those efforts will be determined in Washington, not Brussels. Equally, opinion in NATO itself is clearly divided over the desirability of extending formal access to its

⁹ In a public address in August 2004, Rudd noted in passing that "there is no NATO in East Asia nor is there an East Asian equivalent of the CSCE", continuing that stability in the region had been underpinned by "a strong continuing U.S. strategic presence reinforced by a range of alliance relationships in key regional powers" in Kevin Rudd, "Australia's Engagement with Asia – a New Paradigm?", *Asialink-ANU National Forum*, August 13, 2004.

¹⁰ Kevin Rudd, "The Renewal of Australian Middle Power Diplomacy", address to the Sydney Institute, September 19, 2006.

internal processes to non-NATO partners. This point has been reinforced by the French Minister for Defense, Michele Alliot-Marie, in a clear statement of French attitudes ahead of the Riga Summit.

Geographically, we should indeed acknowledge the contributions made to NATO's military operations by non-Alliance nations. This is the case, for example, for Australia and Japan in Afghanistan, operating however according to different modalities. It would be desirable to improve the practical modalities of their association with NATO operations without changing the essence of the organization, which this author believes should remain a European-Atlantic military alliance.¹¹ This approach is consistent with Australian thinking and expectations, at least in the short to medium term.

In summary, the notion of an expanded NATO to include Australia in some form of membership is probably optimistic, because there seems little need for it and because even at the governmental level in Canberra, the emphasis currently remains on cooperation, albeit in a heightened form. Much will depend on the detail of what is proposed, on operational needs and developments in the next stage of the global war on terror, on attitudes and developments in Australia's own region and on the cycle of domestic politics. A formal alliance of Western nations on a global scale ("global NATO") is an idea whose time is yet to come, at least for Australians.

¹¹ Michele Alliot-Marie, "Don't diminish NATO's effectiveness", Op Ed in the Washington Times, October 20, 2006 accessed at <http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20061019-090449-4426r.htm>.

CAN JAPAN BE A GLOBAL PARTNER FOR NATO?

Masashi Nishihara

On May 4, 2006, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso attended the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels, the first Japanese foreign minister ever to do so. At the meeting he stated, “Down the road, it is my belief that we will eventually discover how we can cooperate not only in policy coordination but also in operational areas as Japan and NATO continue to deepen their mutual understanding.”¹ This is a bold statement for a foreign minister of Japan, considering the strict constraints of the country’s constitution regarding its defense posture and the modalities of defense cooperation it may wish to engage in. It also raises two questions: Why is Japan seeking a closer relationship with NATO? And, what can Japan contribute to NATO? In sum, the question is whether and how Japan can be a global partner for NATO? In undertaking to answer this question an examination of how Japan established its contacts with NATO is warranted.

Japan’s Contacts with NATO

Political Contacts

Japan’s contacts with NATO date back to the Cold War when Japanese defense ministers² visited NATO headquarters in 1979, 1981 and 1984, respectively. But, it was not until after the Cold War ended that NATO’s Secretaries General Manfred Wörner, Javier Solana and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer returned the visit to Tokyo in 1991, 1997 and 2005, respectively. Since the Cold War years, however, only one Japanese defense minister has called on the NATO headquarters. That was in 1992.

Contacts between Japan and NATO have grown stronger since that time, and especially since NATO began to expand its contacts with non-NATO countries. The first contacts were mainly between the political leaders in Tokyo and Brussels and they were fairly formal, with little serious discussion. Then, between 1990 and 1999, high-level seminars, attended by scholars as well as government officials, were organized. Talks between Japanese and senior NATO officials began in 1993. Since then they have met six times, most recently in April 2006. Increasingly substantive contacts between military officers can be added to these aforementioned political contacts. In 1991 the chairman of the Joint Staff Council of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) first went to Brussels and since then three more chairmen of the Joint Staff Council have visited the NATO headquarters.

¹ “Japan and NATO in a New Security Environment”, speech by Foreign Minister Taro Aso, at the NAC Meeting in Brussels, May 4, 2006, available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speecho605.html>.

² The official title of the Japanese defense minister is the Minister of State for Defense Affairs. This is because Japan has a Defense Agency rather than a Defense Ministry.

Links with NATO through its Members and the United States

Through its long time political and economic relations with many of NATO's member countries, Japan is actually quite closely connected to NATO. Both the NATO member countries and Japan regularly hold ministerial and sub-ministerial talks on a wide range of issues of mutual concern, from the Middle East to the problems of an ageing society. Japan also is a member of the G8. Likewise, Tokyo has developed close relations with the European Union, culminating in the Japan–EU Declaration of 1991.

Japan also is a member of NATO's extended family through its alliance with the United States. In fact, article two of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty of 1960 and article two of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 are almost identical with regard to their promotion of free institutions, economic collaboration and political cooperation. These links are not surprising, given that Japan, Europe and the United States all share political values such as human rights, freedom and free market economics. In addition, Japan is acutely aware of its responsibility for contributing to social and political stability in other parts of the world and has joined multinational groups in Europe to achieve this end. In 1992, Japan was accepted as a partner for cooperation by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and it has sent election-monitoring teams to Eastern European countries. In 1996, Japan was invited to become an observer at the Council of Europe and it is also an observer at NATO's Parliamentary Assembly.

Although security connections between Japan and NATO are not as close as their political connections, the SDF has had contacts with its counterparts in some of the other NATO member states. Countries like Canada and the United Kingdom regularly send their training ships to Japan and vice versa. Japanese forces also participate in the Pacific naval exercise conducted by the U.S. Navy.

Overt the last few years, Japanese troops have worked side by side with the troops of NATO member countries in various peace-support operations. For example, since November 2001, Japanese naval vessels have been operating in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea to provide fuel and water for the ships of friendly states fighting against Taliban terrorists in Afghanistan. As of early 2006, ships from eleven countries are engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom, of which eight are NATO members.³

Between January 2004 and July 2006 Japanese ground troops were stationed in Southern Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction missions, in a region controlled by British forces and for the first fourteen months, flanked by Dutch forces. Japanese ground troops, along with Polish and Slovak troops have also been part of a peacekeeping mission under the United Nations Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights on the Syrian–Israeli border. Japan joined UNDOF in 1996. In addition, Japan has sent observers to numerous Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) exercises, organized by NATO member countries.

³ Those NATO countries included Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.

How Japan's Interests in NATO Have Changed

An Expanding Outlook

These contacts, though still limited, are becoming more significant from Tokyo's point of view. For many years after World War II, Japan was reluctant to approach NATO and, for that matter, to discuss security issues with Western leaders other than those of the United States. Being sensitive to international fears that Japan might revive its militaristic past once it acquired sufficient economic power, it moved carefully. Thus, after 1975, when members of the Group of Seven, including Japan, began to meet annually, Japanese leaders were reluctant to discuss security.

After the mid-1980s, however, this attitude slowly began to change. As Western Europe and Japan became more economically interdependent through trade and investments, they also cooperated more often on political matters.⁴ At the same time, Japan began to sense a need to play a larger political and security role commensurate with its economic power, and the United States encouraged, often pressured, Tokyo into assuming more responsibility as its ally. The Gulf War of 1990 to 1991 became a watershed for Japan. Japan sent no troops and was not able to participate in the international peace support operation because its constitution is interpreted as meaning that the only legitimate mission for Japanese forces is the defense of its own country. Therefore, to compensate, Japan donated as much as 13 billion U.S. dollars to U.S.-led Operation Desert Storm, but received little recognition for its contribution. This prompted Japan to promulgate its International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, to provide the basis for sending its troops overseas to take part in peacekeeping operations (PKO). In this way, sharing responsibilities with other like-minded countries has set a new tone for its relations with NATO.

Ambivalence towards NATO

During the Cold War, security specialists and relevant government officials in Japan had a high regard for NATO as a powerful alliance whose members were experienced in diplomacy and had a military strategy that stood firm in the face of the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Indeed, NATO's maintenance of a balance of power along the East-West German border, its nuclear deterrence capabilities and the attraction of freedom in the West, helped turn back the Communists. NATO's leadership was also admired for holding together a large and diverse membership, despite numerous internal differences.

At the same time, during the Cold War, Japan considered Western Europe as a strategic competitor. Situated at each end of the Eurasian continent, Western Europe and Japan, in a sense, competed with each other for U.S. protection. That is, if NATO united solidly against the Soviet bloc, Moscow might decide to shift its weapons to its Far East region, where they would pose a threat to Japan's security. Accordingly, in 1983, when the Group of Seven summit was held at Williamsburg, Virginia, in the United States, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone opposed the European position to let the Soviets

⁴ Yukio Satoh, "Japan and NATO: Agenda for Political Dialogue", NATO Review 40, June 1992, pp. 18-22.

deploy their SS-20 missiles east of the Ural Mountains, stating that “the security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis”.⁵

Similarly, when Western Europe moved toward rapprochement with Russia in the early post-Cold War period, Japan became concerned, as several sources of regional tension remained in East Asia, such as strained relations between China and Taiwan and North Korea’s suspected nuclear development. Until about the mid-1990s, Tokyo feared that with the establishment of NATO’s Partnership of Peace (PfP) and better relations between Russia and NATO, Russia might shift its military personnel and arms to its Far East, thereby creating new tensions with Japan. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has continued to handle its relations with Russia with care while at the same time expanding its membership to include Central and Eastern European countries. Moreover, as Japanese-Russian relations have improved, the Japanese-European competition for U.S. protection has waned. Today, therefore, the Japanese have come to regard NATO as a vital partner in promoting international peace support operations.

Why Does Japan Seek a Closer Partnership with NATO?

Constitutional Constraints on Japan’s Security Role

Despite the restrictions of Japan’s constitution, the government has sent its armed forces to participate in peacekeeping and disaster-relief missions, to Cambodia and Democratic Republic of Timor Leste in Asia, Mozambique and Zaire in Africa, and the Golan Heights, Iraq, Pakistan and the Indian Ocean / Arabian Sea area in the Middle East. Nonetheless, these missions have been severely limited, notwithstanding Japan’s desire to act as a global player.

Article nine of Japan’s 1947 constitution appears to state that Japan cannot maintain any armed forces.⁶ But the government’s position is that Japan has a sovereign right to defend itself, even though article nine does not specifically stipulate this. Indeed, it was in accordance with this reading that Japan created its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954. The government still, however, does not recognize Japan’s “right of collective self-defense”, as opposed to its “right of individual self-defense”. The texts of both the original 1951 security treaty and the revised 1960 security treaty maintain that Japan has “the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense”, as stipulated in article fifty-one of the United Nations Charter. But, since it established an alliance with the United States in 1952, the Japanese government has asserted that the country will not exercise the right to collective self-defense, because exercising that right would go beyond the minimum necessary level of defense capability, which it has claimed is consistent with the spirit of the constitution.

⁵ Yukio Satoh, *op cit*, p. 18.

⁶ Article nine reads “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes ... In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized”.

The impact of Japan's defeat in World War II and its criticism of its own wartime militarism have been so strong that until 1991 the government insisted that the SDF should not participate in international peacekeeping operations. In that year, however, it reversed its position. The 1992 law allows the SDF to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations, as long as their mission is restricted to humanitarian and reconstruction work. Their deployment on such missions is permitted only if there is a ceasefire, if the parties to the conflict consent to the Japanese peacekeeping role, if the mission is impartial and if the forces will withdraw if the conflict reignites.

This self-restraint still holds today and so the mission of Japan's ground forces in Iraq between January 2005 and July 2006 was limited to humanitarian and reconstruction work. Although Japanese troops regularly patrolled the streets, they did so primarily to ensure their own safety rather than that of the local people. Japan's air force still transports coalition forces between Kuwait and Baghdad, but only unarmed soldiers and not weapons and ammunition. A law passed in 2004 still prevents Japan from being associated with U.S.-led operations to restore Iraq's internal security. And, it was an antiterrorist law passed in November 2001 that allowed Japan's naval forces to dispatch ships to the Indian Ocean to provide fuel and water to the ships of friendly states. This law states that if friendly ships receiving fuel and water from Japanese ships are attacked by hostile forces, the Japanese ships can help to protect them. But, if the friendly ships are merely near Japanese ships, waiting to be supplied, Japan's ships cannot help protect them. This is because protecting friendly ships under attack is considered to be an exercise of the right of collective self-defense and, therefore, unconstitutional.

Is Japan a “Global Partner”?

At the NATO foreign ministers' meeting, held in Sofia, Bulgaria, in April 2006, the United States and Great Britain proposed that NATO reach beyond its traditional partnerships and establish stronger relations with those countries outside Europe that share NATO's core political values and that could contribute to its peacekeeping and peace support operations. Possible candidates included Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. At the Sofia meeting, NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer was quoted as saying “*We will need to look as to how to strengthen our relations with other interested and potentially force-contributing countries*”.⁷ He also said that NATO did not want to become a global alliance but instead sought “*an alliance with global partners*.”⁸ Some scholars, however, advocate a “Global NATO”.⁹ The question for Japan is whether it can become an ally of NATO and whether it is entitled to be called a global partner?

Japan and the United States refer to themselves as “global partners”. In January 1992, the two countries issued a joint declaration entitled the “Tokyo Declaration on the U.S.–Japan Global Partnership”. This was probably the first time that the two countries called themselves “global partners”. Since then, when Japan and the United States issue joint statements, they usually refer to their bilateral cooperation on such global issues as supporting the United Nations, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, resolving the North Korean nuclear problem and promoting the economic well-being and democratic stability of developing countries. Yet, with

7 Patrick Goodenough, “NATO Eyes Partnerships in the East” available at <http://www.crosswalk.com/news/1393863.html>.

8 See <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/04-april/e0427c.html>.

9 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO” in *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2006, pp. 105-113.

regard to security matters, Japan has declined to exercise its right to collective self-defense, thereby narrowing the options of a fully functioning Japan–U.S. alliance. As an American specialist wrote, “As long as Japan continues to interpret Article 9 as prohibiting collective self-defense actions, especially with the United States, it impedes Japan’s ability to participate fully in regional and global operations and missions.”¹⁰

When NATO leaders refer to global partners, they of course mean global partners in security. NATO’s global partners are democracies willing to contribute their troops and arms to a common cause and to help prevent regional and internal conflicts and enforce peace in areas of conflict. Furthermore, NATO expects its global partners to fight together with it to bring peace and stability to the world.

According to this definition, Japan is not quite a global partner. Although Japan is a fully-fledged democracy, and its armed forces can only be deployed overseas for peacekeeping operations, their role is limited. Based on article nine of the constitution, the SDF cannot fight together with NATO’s other partners, because Japan cannot exercise its right to collective self-defense.

Japanese people and their leaders are becoming increasingly aware that Japan should play a larger political and security role in world affairs. Even though Japan lost its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in the fall of 2005, its campaign was indicative of its willingness to take on more responsibility for managing international peace and security. Indeed, Tokyo feels that it must enhance its political presence throughout the world by participating in international groups that frame the world order. It has slowly established a presence in European institutions, including NATO. But, Japan has not been able to resolve the constitutional constraints that currently impede its security policy, suggesting that it can be neither a global partner for NATO nor a new ally. Nonetheless, if Japan cannot be a “global partner”, it can still be a useful partner. Accordingly, NATO should seek a partnership with Japan and not an alliance until Japan changes its interpretation of its constitution.

Multilateralizing Japan’s Security Partnerships

Japan has been seeking security partners, if not defense partners, beyond the Japan–U.S. alliance. Besides discussing security at ministerial level with many Asian Pacific countries, including South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore and China, Japan is an active member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to which the European Union also belongs, and its naval forces are a participants in the biannual U.S.-led Pacific Rim exercise. Japan’s armed forces also participate in many other regional ground and naval exercises, including the multinational submarine rescue exercise organized by Singapore in 2000. Finally, foreign and defense ministers of Japan, the United States and Australia have begun strategic discussions, although some critics are skeptical of this three-party cooperation.¹¹

Japan’s security partners also include NATO member countries and its foreign and defense ministries conduct regular political-military and military-military talks with Canada, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Thus, in the process of multilateralizing its security partners, Japan is seeking closer partnership with NATO.

¹⁰ Balbina Y. Hwang, “Japan’s New Security Outlook: Implications for the United States”, Policy Research and Analysis, Heritage Foundation, July 7, 2005, available at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1865.cfm>.

¹¹ Purnendra Jain and John Bruni, “Japan, Australia, and the United States: Little NATO or Shadow Alliance”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 265-85.

Two Concerns about Pacific Rim Membership in an Expanded NATO

NATO's efforts to involve Pacific Rim democracies as "global partners" raise two concerns for Japan. The first concern relates to the displeasure of China and Russia with Pacific Rim countries that cooperate with NATO, something that might lead to their forming a counter alliance to NATO activities in the Pacific. Indeed, Beijing and Moscow must be apprehensive about NATO's reaching out to Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries for new members, to Afghanistan and Iraq for regional stability, to the Pacific Rim democracies for new partners and about the United States' reaching out to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia. China, in particular, may see itself being sandwiched in by Europe and the Pacific, a feeling that may be at the root of its close cooperation with Russia and Central Asia to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).¹²

Organized in 2001, the SCO has grown quickly. In 2005 China and Russia held joint landing exercises near Qingdao facing the Yellow Sea and in September 2005 Uzbekistan demanded that the United States close its bases, promptly turning to Moscow for its security needs. NATO should, therefore, avoid forcing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization into becoming a counterweight. Second, if Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand joined NATO or established formal relations with the organization, what would happen to the bilateral alliances between the United States and the first three countries?¹³ Japan and the United States often stress that their bilateral alliance is key to the peace and stability of the Asian Pacific region. How would the ties among Japan, Australia and the United States fit with an expanded NATO? Accordingly, if the Pacific Rim democracies form a closer partnership with NATO, they must make sure not to overlook regional security issues such as North Korea's nuclear program and the issues over the Strait of Taiwan.

What Can Japan Do for NATO?

Policy Coordination and Operational Cooperation

Japan can offer NATO both policy coordination and operational cooperation. Given its current constitutional constraints, Japan can intensify its strategic dialogue and coordinate its policy with NATO without becoming a formal member. Such a relationship would be similar to that between Tokyo and Canberra, that is, although Japan and Australia are not formally allied, they do share a strategic outlook. Likewise, Japan and NATO could coordinate their policies on many security-related issues, including maintaining peace after conflict, solving transnational crime, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting terrorism, providing natural-disaster relief, offering energy security, and dealing with environmental degradation. They even could begin to share intelligence. Foreign Minister Aso spoke of Japan's interest in "*establishing regular contact with the North Atlantic Council,*" adding that

¹² The SCO's forerunner, the Shanghai Five, started in 1996 with China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In 2001, it was expanded to the SCO, with Uzbekistan as a sixth member. Observer status was given to Mongolia in 2005 and to Iran, India and Pakistan in 2006.

¹³ New Zealand withdrew from the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty.

*“during the course of discussions, Japan will consider the most appropriate modality of cooperation within NATO within its constitutional framework”.*¹⁴

With regard to operational cooperation, Japan and NATO should start at a low level, perhaps in the area of education and training. For example, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and NATO officers could increase their understanding of each other’s strategic thinking and together participate in seminars on defense and Peace Support Operations (PSO). As a beginning, in June 2006 Japanese officers attended a PSO seminar in Spain and observed a Cooperative Maco exercise held in Romania and one SDF officer is attending the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy. NATO officers also might consider attending Japanese defense colleges.

The next and a higher level of operational cooperation might be the provision of logistical support by Japan for NATO troops. Up until summer 2006, SDF and NATO member state troops worked side by side in Iraq, as well as in Northern Pakistan to help refugees from the 2005 earthquake, although they did not cooperate in logistical support. Japan and NATO, thus, could establish a mechanism for future operational cooperation, so that the SDF and NATO troops could provide logistical support to each other, with the United States as the contact country.

A third and further level of operational cooperation might be Japan’s participation in NATO military exercises. In the biannual multinational naval exercise (Rim of the Pacific or RimPac exercise), held by the U.S. Navy in the Pacific theatre, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force is currently restricted to participating only in bilateral exercises with the United States. So that it might eventually participate with the United States in a NATO multinational naval exercise, Japan and NATO should study more closely the interoperability between their respective weapons systems.

A Scenario for the Future

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe has made clear his interest in reviewing article nine of the constitution and reinterpreting Japan’s “right of individual self-defense”. Revision of the constitution requires the support of a two-thirds majority in both houses of the National Diet and the subsequent support of a simple majority in a national referendum. This will take time so the government should move quickly to reinterpret article nine so as to allow Japan to exercise its inherent right to collective self-defense. This in turn will expand Japan’s role in its alliance with the United States and enhance its level of cooperation with NATO. In the near future, then, Japan will not become a global partner for NATO, but will remain a useful and active partner. Then later, if Japan is able to establish a constitutional framework that is compatible with article five of the North Atlantic Treaty, it will have more policy options regarding its participation in a global NATO.

¹⁴ Foreign Minister Aso, “Japan and NATO in a New Security Environment”, available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speecho605.html>.

About the Authors

[Uzi Arad](#) is Founding Director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy of the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. He is a well-respected figure in foreign policy, security and strategic circles. At the Institute, he established and chairs the Annual Herzliya Conference Series on Israel's Balance of National Security. Uzi Arad also founded and chairs the Atlantic Forum of Israel. After twenty-five years of distinguished service in the Mossad, Israel's Secret Intelligence Service, that culminated in his tenure as Director of Intelligence (equivalent to the rank of Major General), Uzi Arad was appointed by then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to serve as his Foreign Policy Advisor. Today, he is the Advisor to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Prior to his career in government, Uzi Arad was a Professional Staff Member of the Hudson Institute in New York in the United States and a Research Fellow at Tel Aviv University's Center for Strategic Studies. Uzi Arad received his Bachelor's Degree from Tel Aviv University. In 1971, he was awarded a Fulbright Fellowship for advanced studies at Princeton University, where he earned his Master's Degree and Ph.D. in International Relations (Class of 1975).

[Ronald D. Asmus](#) is Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels, Belgium. He has written widely on U.S.-European relations and is the author of *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). He served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs in the Clinton Administration from 1997 to 2000. He has previously worked as a Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, Council on Foreign Relations, RAND and Radio Free Europe. Ronald D. Asmus has been awarded the U.S. State Department's Distinguished Honor Award; the Republic of Poland's Commander's Cross; the Kingdom of Sweden's Royal Order of the Polar Star; the Republic of Lithuania's Order of the Grand Duke Gediminas; and the Republic of Estonia's Order of the Cross of St. Mary's Land; and the Republic of Latvia's

Order of the Three Stars. Ronald D. Asmus holds a Ph.D. in European studies from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University.

[Ambassador Oded Eran](#) joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1966 upon completion of his military service and graduation from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, where he studied Middle Eastern Studies and Political Science. Ambassador Eran served in the Embassy of Israel in London and obtained a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics in 1981. Ambassador Eran served twice in the Embassy of Israel in Washington, DC, first as a Liaison Officer with the U.S. Congress and then as Deputy Chief of Mission. From 1980, Ambassador Eran was involved in the Peace Process between Israel and its neighbors. He was head of the department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dealing with the normalization of relations with Egypt (1980 to 1982), the head of Israel's delegation to the Regional Economic Working Group (part of the 1991 Madrid Conference), a member of the Israeli team that negotiated the Paris Economic agreement with the Palestinians (1993 to 1994), Israel's Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (1997 to 2000) and Head of the Negotiation Team with the Palestinians (1999 to 2000). Ambassador Eran led in 2005 to 2006 the negotiations with NATO over the Individual Cooperation Program, the first of its kind between the Alliance and a Mediterranean Dialogue country. Oded Eran is currently Israel's Ambassador to the European Union and NATO.

[Jeffrey Grey](#) is a Professor of History in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University College, Australian Defense Force Academy in Canberra. He holds the degrees of Bachelor of Arts (Honors) from the Australian National University (1983) and Doctor of Philosophy from the University of New South Wales (1986). He is the author or editor of twenty-six books in the fields of Australian and comparative and international military history, and has published numerous articles, chapters and reviews in these fields. In (northern) academic years 2000 to 2002 he held the Major General Matthew C. Horner Chair in Military Theory at the

Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia, in the United States. He is a trustee and parliamentarian of the Society for Military History (U.S.), and has been editor of the journal *War & Society*, a member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Military History* (U.S.) and currently sits on the boards of *War in History* (UK), *Scientia Militaria* (South Africa) and *World War II* magazine (U.S.). In March 2004 he was appointed Director of the University of New South Wales Defense Studies Forum.

Masashi Nishihara is Japan's leading analyst and commentator on international security affairs. He is currently President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security. Masashi Nishihara was President of the National Defense Academy until March 2006. Prior to that he was Professor of International Relations at the Academy. He also served as Director of the First Research Department of the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. Masashi Nishihara has had a significant impact on the education of the next generation of Japanese officers and scholars in international and Japanese security studies. He was a member of Prime Minister Koizumi's Task Force on External Relations. He also served on the council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Masashi Nishihara's principal works cover Japan's role in regional and international affairs, Japanese security and defense policy, the Japan-United States security alliance, Japan-Europe relations as well as Indonesian politics, political corruption in Southeast Asia, East Asian security, multilateral peacekeeping and Vietnamese politics. Masashi Nishihara holds a B.A. in Law from Kyoto University (1962), an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Michigan (1968), and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan (1972).

Abdulaziz O. Sager is Chairman and Founder of the Gulf Research Center. He is also President of Sager Group Holding in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is active in the fields of information technology, aviation services and investments. In November 2003, Abdulaziz Sager became a member of the Makkah Province Council. In addition, he serves on the Advisory Board of the Arab Thought Foundation and on the Advisory Group for the

4th Arab Human Development Report for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Abdulaziz Sager's special research interest lies in the area of Gulf strategic issues. He is a regular contributor to and commentator in international and regional media including *Al-Arabiya* television, the *Al-Khaleej* newspaper, *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, *Arab News* and the *Daily Star*. He also regularly participates in regional and international forums and conferences held on issues relevant to the Gulf region. Abdulaziz Sager holds a Master's Degree in International Relations from the University of Kent at Canterbury in the United Kingdom. He wrote his thesis on *The External Factors Threatening Political Stability in the GCC States*. He is currently working on a research program entitled *Gulf Security, Dynamics, Perceptions and Policies, 1971-2003: A Comparative Study of the GCC States*.

Tommy Steiner is the Executive Secretary of the Atlantic Forum of Israel and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC), where he leads policy research projects on EU and NATO relations with Israel and the Broader Middle East. Concurrently, he teaches International Relations and Security Studies at the IDC's Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy. He regularly advises the Israeli Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Finance and the National Security Council on his fields of expertise, which include EU and NATO relations with Israel, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, regionalism in the Mediterranean and Asia-Pacific and Security Studies. He previously coordinated academic activities for the EU-Israel Forum. Tommy Steiner graduated with a Master's Degree (cum laude) in International Relations from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he is currently pursuing his Ph.D. He is a recipient of the Harkaby Award.

About the Organizers of the Riga Conference

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between the United States and Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has six offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, and Ankara (www.gmfus.org).

The Latvian Transatlantic Organisation

The Latvian Transatlantic Organisation (LATO) is a non-governmental organization established in March 2000 to promote Latvia's full and active membership in NATO and to work for international security and democracy in NATO and the EU near neighborhood region. It unites members from different social groups in terms of age and professional interests. LATO was established with the objective of facilitating Latvia's membership in NATO. Education and information activities, aimed at increasing public support for NATO membership, have been carried out. These activities explained and built public awareness about the principles and values that unite NATO member states. Since Latvia achieved its main foreign policy goal of joining the EU and NATO, LATO has continued its work providing information on international defense and security issues and questions related to Latvia's full participation in NATO. LATO has also

become an active partner in the promotion of democratic values and the strengthening of civil society in the neighboring region, including Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. The scope of LATO activities is both local and international. Its activities include conferences, seminars, summer schools and work with partner organizations and mass media. The LATO Information Center ensures accessibility of information and facilitates understanding about security and defense policy questions, as well as encouraging interest in participation in LATO activities.

The Commission of Strategic Analysis


Latvia's Commission of Strategic Analysis under the auspices of the President of the Republic of Latvia was established on April 2, 2004, at the initiative of the President of Latvia, Dr. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga. Its founding resolution was jointly signed by the President and the Prime Minister. The Commission's main goal is to generate a long-term vision of Latvia's development through interdisciplinary and future-oriented studies. The Commission of Strategic Analysis is a think tank that seeks to consolidate Latvia's scholarly potential for the benefit of Latvia's future development. It has undertaken research on Latvia's opportunities as a member of the European Union and NATO, along with Latvia's place in global development processes. The Commission also stimulates high-quality dialogue with the country's legislative and executive powers, as well as the general public, on matters that concern Latvia's development and the consolidation of democracy.

The Riga Conference was organized by

G | M | F The German Marshall Fund
of the United States

STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

COMMISSION
OF STRATEGIC
ANALYSIS



With the support of



Co-chairs:



DAIMLERCHRYSLER



LIEPĀJAS METALURGS

