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**CONCOURS EXTERNE ET INTERNE POUR L'ACCÈS A  
L'EMPLOI DE SECRÉTAIRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES  
(CADRE GÉNÉRAL ET CADRE D'ORIENT)  
AU TITRE DE L'ANNÉE 2024**

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**ÉPREUVES ÉCRITES D'ADMISSIBILITÉ**

**Jeudi 21 septembre 2023**

**ANGLAIS**

Durée totale de l'épreuve : 3 heures

Coefficient : 2

Toute note globale inférieure à 10 sur 20 est éliminatoire

Barème de notation : composition en anglais 12 points ; traduction en français 8 points

*Composition en anglais à partir d'une question, rédigée dans cette même langue,  
liée à l'actualité (500 mots avec une tolérance de plus ou moins 10%)*

**SUJET :**

What role for the BRICS on the global stage ?



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**TRADUCTION EN FRANÇAIS**

*Traduction en français d'un texte rédigé en anglais*

**TEXTE AU VERSO**

## The need for European ‘strategic reconciliation’

By Mathieu Droin and James Joye Townsend Jr.

May 10, 2023 4:00 am CET

French President Emmanuel Macron’s comments to POLITICO on his way back from China recently prompted outrage across the transatlantic community. And the fiercest backlash came from Central and Eastern Europe.

The uproar was a symptom of nervousness. Most European governments fear doing any harm to the relationship with the United States, as its commitment to the defense of Europe has proved more vital than ever with the war in Ukraine. But there may be some delusion in thinking that this American commitment can be relied on indefinitely.

So, to make sure this relationship stays strong, there’s now an urgent need for “strategic reconciliation” among Europeans, which requires putting away toxic conceptual debates and accelerating efforts to build a stronger European defense — one that is not duplicative but in harmony with that of the U.S.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, most Central and Eastern European countries are experiencing an “I told you so” moment. They had warned that the West was not being tough enough with Russia, that dependence on Russian hydrocarbons was a strategic mistake, and that dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin was tantamount to a blessing for his conduct. They were also proven right in saying that only the U.S. could effectively ride to the rescue.

These countries are therefore happy to now bury the concept of European “strategic autonomy,” which refers to the Continent’s capacity to act and decide for itself — that is, without asking for America’s permission. Because while they’ve accepted the concept on paper in official European Union documents, most of Central and Eastern Europe see it as risking a decoupling from the U.S.

This moment follows four years of French-championed efforts to shore up “European strategic autonomy,” when former U.S. President Donald Trump was in the White House, giving Europe a glimpse of what an inward-looking, transactional U.S. relationship with Europe could look like. Some Central and Eastern European governments were alarmed enough to hedge by putting some of their eggs in the fledgling EU security and defense basket. And the subsequent awkward fumbles involving Europe in the first year of President Joe Biden’s administration — such as the chaotic, poorly coordinated withdrawal from Kabul and the surprise AUKUS rollout in the Indo-Pacific — didn’t help things either. It took the war to change things.

So, which side of Europe now stands on the right side of history? Are we witnessing, as many profess, a shift in the intra-European balance of power away from “old Europe,” and the final curtain for strategic autonomy?

Crucially, this debate over strategic autonomy should not be framed by how much U.S. we want in Europe, as what matters, in the long run, is how much the U.S. want to be in Europe.

And the answer to this lies neither in Ukraine nor in Brussels, neither is it in Warsaw or in Paris — it is in Washington, and it is in states like Ohio and California. The next “I told you so” cycle will be determined by the next U.S. elections. And no matter who wins the presidency in 2024, both Democrats and Republicans want European nations to shoulder more of the military burden in Europe.

Framed this way, building a more autonomous European defense is urgent. [...]